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ABSTRACT
The term “militia” is polarizing, misunderstood, misapplied, and generally difficult
for modern Americans to digest. That is not surprising, given the depth and breadth
of American militia history and militias’ substantial evolution over four centuries.
Historically, militia simply refers to a broad-based civic duty to protect one’s fel-
low citizens from internal and external dangers and is not limited to activities involving
firearms. Reestablishing militia’s true meaning and purpose—and reinvigorating in-
dependent state militias in the United States to effect that purpose—has the potential
to address states’ emerging financial and security gaps and to produce multiple other
significant benefits, including recalibrating federalism. This Article suggests a method
for how best to reinvigorate independent state militias, addresses the major critique
against doing so, and initiates a real discussion about the future of state militias—an
issue conspicuously underdeveloped in scholarship today.
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INTRODUCTION
Militia. What does the term mean? What is its historical significance, and how has
it evolved in America over nearly four centuries? Why did it merit special reference
in the Bill of Rights, and why has pure state militia duty been rendered effectively
dormant? What positive roles, if any, could independent state militias play today? This
Article addresses those questions in an effort to ignite a serious discussion about the
future of state militias—an issue unfortunately underdeveloped in current scholarship.
Given the financial and security challenges facing our national, state, and local
governments today, militias have never been more relevant. Militias in their National
Guard form play a critical role in national and international defense and security. But
the effective federalization of state militias has practically deprived states of an im-
portant tool to address their domestic-security and emergency-response challenges1
and has radically altered those militias’ role as a fulcrum of federalism.
Based on militias’ historical performance and states’ current needs, state mili-
tias offer an attractive option for addressing the increasing domestic-security and
emergency-response challenges facing states and their localities today. Providing
states a meaningful opportunity to reinvigorate independent state militias would allow
them to address those challenges better and would recalibrate federalism, reestablish-
ing for citizens and their states a tool the Supreme Court has recognized is essential
in combating government tyranny. The foundation for reinvigorating and moderniz-
ing state-focused militias is supported by history, state constitutions, public policy,
and the careful constitutional balancing of powers among citizens, state governments,
and the national government.
Part I of this Article discusses the origin, characteristics, and evolution of state
militia duty and offers historical evidence identifying those militias’ core purposes
and their performance in those contexts. Part II addresses the basic opposition to re-
invigorating state-focused militias based on a civic-republican critique and considers
1 For example, during his first campaign for President, Barack Obama acknowledged an
increasing inability for existing federal forces to address the nation’s domestic-security needs
adequately and recommended creating a civilian national defense force, which he described
as serving many of the same core purposes of traditional state militias. See Senator Barack
Obama, Address to Supporters at a Campaign Stop in Colorado Springs, CO (July 2, 2008),
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Df2p6867_pw.
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the import of state constitutions on the proper characterization of state militia duty.
Part III offers a view of how to structure and conceptualize reinvigorated state mili-
tias and provides illustrations showing how those militias could meaningfully address
emerging challenges to state governments while also reestablishing militias’ recog-
nized check-on-tyranny function with simple modifications of federal law. Reinvig-
orated, modernized independent state militias would build on state militias’ historical
successes but make them more nimble, more representative of the citizens they serve,
and more effective in twenty-first-century America while respecting the unique role
and successes of the National Guard.
I. THE ORIGIN, NATURE, EVOLUTION, AND EFFICACY OF STATE MILITIAS
State militia duty is a difficult and complex concept to unpack because it has
evolved so significantly over the past four hundred years. The duty is quite broad—
it implies a civic duty owed by a large portion of the population to defend fellow citi-
zens from internal and external threats and to provide a meaningful way for citizens to
resist government overreaching. The duty historically has been exercised both individ-
ually and collectively by citizens, and its prominence and relevance have diminished
significantly as federal law has increasingly subjected state militias to actual or de
facto national control. State militias’ relationships with their state and national govern-
ments previously maintained a unique and delicate balance between independent and
government-directed action, between faithfully supporting legitimate government
requests to protect fellow citizens and resisting perceived illegitimate government re-
quests that overreached. Historically, militias have proved to be essential to the effec-
tive operation of national and state governments. Today, effective federalization of state
militias has improved their performance in the domestic-defense context at the ex-
pense of their other functions, particularly as a check on tyranny.
This Part addresses the evolving characteristics of state militias throughout their
history, focusing on three different dimensions: (A) the obligations militia duty im-
poses on citizens, and which citizens are so obligated; (B) the relationship between
state militias and government; and (C) the core functions of state militias. Those three
dimensions dictate the historical efficacy of state militias and inform consideration of
how those militias could best serve the needs of today’s U.S. citizens.
A. State Militia Duty Obligations and Affected Citizens
1. Early American Militias Derived from European Militias and Imported Similar
Concepts of Militia Duty
The concept of state militias originated millennia ago, when ancient Greek city-
states required all able-bodied, free male citizens to serve as citizen-soldiers in defense
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of the state.2 The Romans adopted the concept, and it spread throughout Europe.3
During the Middle Ages, able-bodied members of society frequently had a civic duty
to defend their community, and the civic duty by its nature imposed upon those citi-
zens the responsibility to train and prepare themselves to fulfill that duty effectively.4
With little support from any sovereign, early militias in large part were citizen-led,
citizen-organized, and citizen-funded.5 Those militias, like their forebears, did not
include all residents but instead were limited to landowning individuals who, in that
society’s view, were able to fulfill the civic duty.6 And although not all components
of society were represented in the militias, the militias were diffuse enough to reflect
the will of the people.7
Early militias like England’s Great Fyrd were characterized by a civic duty de-
fined primarily by three features. First, any physically capable individual who owned
land within a sovereign’s domestic borders bore responsibility to assist defending it
from internal and external threats.8 Second, that responsibility was part-time, on an as-
needed basis, but membership was continuous during the period of capability and eli-
gibility, and members were prepared to be called into service during that period.9 Third,
it was each individual’s obligation to train and arm himself to the extent necessary
2 MICHAEL D. DOUBLER & JOHN W. LISTMAN, JR., THE NATIONAL GUARD 1 (2d ed.
2007). The concept of citizen-soldiers goes back even further, at least to the fifth century B.C.
Nehemiah relied on Hebrew citizen-soldiers to defend themselves from external threats while
rebuilding the walls of Jerusalem, Nehemiah 4:7–23, and the Jews in Persia themselves de-
fended against the attacks authorized by King Ahasuerus and Haman, Esther 9:1–16.
3 DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 1; see also James Biser Whisker, The Citizen-
Soldier Under Federal and State Law, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 947, 952 (1992).
4 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that “each male was obligated to
military service and citizen-soldiers had to provide their own arms and equipment”); JOHN K.
MAHON, HISTORY OF THE MILITIA AND THE NATIONAL GUARD 6 (Louis Morton ed., 1983)
(“[I]ndividuals were expected to turn out when called with whatever weapons they could
acquire.”). Initially, each colonizing agency sent a professional soldier “to train the entire
community in the use of arms.” Whisker, supra note 3, at 952, 954.
5 DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 1–2 (noting that Spanish settlers in Puerto Rico
and Florida organized themselves into militia commands, established day and night watches,
and began routine training); MAHON, supra note 4, at 14–15 (noting that private groups that
founded the early settlements received no military assistance from the crown).
6 A prototypical example of such an early militia is The Great Fyrd, which included the
“entire free male population of military age” in England. MAHON, supra note 4, at 6; see also
DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 5; Whisker, supra note 3, at 952. Although The Great
Fyrd did not include women and was age-limited, its composition proved much more repre-
sentative of the population than a purely professional force, and its self-armed, self-trained
members reduced the government’s military financial burdens. DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra
note 2, at 5; MAHON, supra note 4, at 8–9; Whisker, supra note 3, at 952.
7 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 14 (noting that English colonies “believed that a military
obligation rested on every free, white male settler”).
8 See id. at 7, 10.
9 Id. at 7.
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to provide the expected assistance.10 That concept of militia was imported into the
United States through English colonization, and those same key principles provided
the foundation for the state militias as they evolved in early America.11
2. State Militia Duty Was Imposed on a Broad Swath of Citizens, but Not All
From its colonial origins, state militia duty extended to a broad band of citizens,
although it never comprised all citizens (nor was that the goal). However, those mili-
tias were much more diffuse, representative, and exclusively loyal to the citizenry
at large than their professional contemporaries, who had some measure of separation
from the citizenry and owed their first duty to their government-employed superiors.
Originally, militia duty was linked to perceived military capability, was limited to
white men aged sixteen to around sixty, and exempted conscientious objectors, among
others.12 Over four centuries, the scope of colonial, then state, militias’ membership
has evolved, generally expanding. States have eliminated racial distinctions, and some
have extended militia membership to women, but age restrictions have persisted.13
Although state militias embrace a wide spectrum of their citizenry, they are by no
means universal. Similarly, the unorganized federal militia currently retains signifi-
cant restrictions on membership, generally excluding men aged forty-five and older
and women who are not members of the National Guard.14
3. Militia Duty Initially Was Mandatory, but State Militias Later Embraced
Actual or De Facto Volunteer Models
Militia duty in America initially was mandatory by necessity, like that imposed
on England’s Great Fyrd. Landowning British colonists imported from their home
country the belief that the duty to defend their communities was appurtenant to their
right to own their land.15 And the colonists took this responsibility seriously: failure
to fulfill militia duty was punishable by corporal punishment in times of war or im-
minent danger, or by fines in times of peace.16 However, the multiple ways to avoid
10 DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 1; MAHON, supra note 4, at 10, 14.
11 MAHON, supra note 4, at 6.
12 Id. at 14, 18; Whisker, supra note 3, at 956.
13 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 44-1 (2012) (including in the state militia “all able-bodied
residents of the Commonwealth” between the ages of sixteen and fifty-five).
14 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2006).
15 Members were actively involved in militia leadership decisions, and leaders frequently
directed training activities. MAHON, supra note 4, at 15–16, 18, 57 (noting that militia offi-
cers were chosen by fellow militia members, by popular vote, or by official appointment and
that militias trained on a regular basis, but the frequency correlated to the perceived degree of
danger facing their respective communities).
16 Id. at 18 (noting that in times of peace, many rich people paid rather than serve or served
in volunteer militias).
2013] THE DORMANT SECOND AMENDMENT 1027
personal militia service confirm the duty was not universal: militia members who were
unwilling or unable to serve could provide a substitute or pay a fine, some states ex-
empted new citizens for a time, and slave states exempted from service overseers of
four or more slaves.17
To ensure militia members were prepared to perform their duty, most colonial
militias required each household to own and maintain its own arms and often required
wealthier households to arm their servants, as well.18 If one could not afford to buy
arms, some colonies rented them to militia members (as in New England), colonists
could work for someone who could provide them arms (as in South Carolina), and
other colonies assessed special taxes to provide arms for the poor.19 All colonies kept
some public arms, but those arms typically were poorly maintained and often were not
returned when lent to militia members.20
The nature of the civic militia duty began to evolve within a few decades of
colonial militias’ birth—no longer was the duty purely mandatory; volunteer militia
companies emerged as early as 1638 in colonies with a critical mass of financially
successful individuals.21 Those volunteer companies typically were specialty divisions,
such as horsemen and artillery, which provided the militias with unique capabilities
but imposed on participating company members a high cost to maintain the horses or
unique arms they required.22 Members of those companies typically received special
government privileges (such as tax benefits) to offset those increased costs.23 Orga-
nizationally, some volunteer militia companies were independent of the mandatory
militias, while others were incorporated in the colony’s mandatory structure.24
After the War of 1812, the reduced danger posed by external threats like England
and Native Americans25 fueled state militias’ decline generally and transformed the
17 Id. South Carolina exempted new citizens for a year, and Virginia expected free blacks
to serve in labor roles but exempted them from military duty. Id.
18 Id. at 16.
19 Id. (noting that eighty-seven percent of early Virginian settlers were armed no matter the
cost because of their desire to live in isolated, rural settings that required them to provide for
their own security).
20 Id. at 17. Only in New England were public arms relatively well kept and in sufficient
numbers, due in large part to a close-knit community system, which imposed meaningful ac-
countability through periodic inspection of the arms, among other measures. Id.
21 Id. at 18. Volunteer companies often were specialty companies, which were more expen-
sive to maintain. For example, while mandatory militia members typically lacked uniforms,
volunteers paid for their own uniforms and paid dues to maintain their own meeting and train-
ing places. Id. at 18, 31–32, 57.
22 Id. at 31–32.
23 Id. at 17 (noting that some also received exemption from involuntary military draft
service).
24 Id. at 18.
25 When I refer to external threats, I refer to threats that did not reside within the sover-
eign territory of the United States and its predecessor colonies.
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duty into a predominately voluntary exercise.26 Extreme population growth created
extremely large theoretical mandatory militias27—militias whose size rendered them
difficult if not impossible for governments to organize and manage effectively. It made
sense for governments to transition to voluntary models.28
In light of those new realities, numerous states eliminated mandatory militia ser-
vice or minimized the penalties for failing to appear for such mandatory service. By
the mid-nineteenth century, state militias based on mandatory service were essentially
obsolete, replaced by volunteer-based state militias.29 The contraction of militias to
predominantly volunteer forces effectively distilled them to their finest core: the most
dedicated, courageous, disciplined, and prepared of the eligible citizens.30
The Civil War and further perceived reductions in external military threats tested
the state militias’ stability and their communities’ commitment to maintaining them.
For example, the Civil War drained volunteer militias of a considerable number of
their ranks, as the survivors had little interest in volunteer military service after such
a taxing, extended, and emotional conflict.31 Thereafter, with the United States’ major
internal conflict resolved and the regular army perceived as capable of addressing re-
maining external threats (primarily Native American), volunteer militia service—and
public perceptions of its significance—waned substantially in the decade following the
Civil War.32
Like any primarily citizen-directed, citizen-staffed public service entity, militia
success frequently depended upon sufficient commitment by the community and local
institutions, as well as infrastructural characteristics that made it easier for a critical
mass of citizens to coordinate their efforts effectively. Thus, militias in areas with
a compact geographic base, relatively dense population, strong citizen support, and
deep-rooted militia traditions typically thrived.33 For example, New England militias
26 Fewer saw the need to require militia service in the absence of immediate, persistent
external threats to their communities. DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 22; see MAHON,
supra note 4, at 82–83.
27 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 22.
28 See id. at 22–23.
29 Delaware abolished mandatory militia duty in 1831, and over the next two decades
Massachusetts (1840), Maine, Ohio, Vermont (1844), Connecticut, New York (1846),
Missouri (1847), and New Hampshire (1851), among other states, did likewise. Id. at 23;
MAHON, supra note 4, at 83.
30 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 26.
31 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 104, 108.
32 Whisker, supra note 3, at 966. Even earlier, colonial expansion revealed the relation-
ship between health of militias and perceived threats: as settlements extended inland, they
provided an ever-growing buffer for coastal communities, whose militias deteriorated as the
imminent need to repel Native American invasions decreased. DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra
note 2, at 6.
33 For example, the quality and frequency of company-level training varied and was highly
dependent on the captain’s commitment and the ease with which militia members could gather,
favoring densely populated areas with robust infrastructure. MAHON, supra note 4, at 56–57.
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generally were considered the strongest overall, as many companies were organized
in communities with one or more of those characteristics, including support from the
politically and socially powerful area churches.34 Virginia and Maryland benefitted
from strong historical traditions of militia duty, but were organized by counties that
were larger and lacked the population density of northern militias, and they enjoyed
less community support from their churches.35 South of Virginia, militia quality varied
significantly, as many rural areas lacked those key infrastructural and societal advan-
tages while some urban areas, like Charleston, South Carolina, possessed them.36
State militia duty originally imposed a duty on many—but not all—citizens to
defend their community from internal and external threats. Originally a mandatory
duty produced by necessity, given the large population of today’s United States, gov-
ernments have sensibly embraced a voluntary model of militia duty, which has proved
historically successful.
B. State Militias and Government
The relationship between state militias and government has always been unique.
State militias were designed to operate for the benefit of citizens and, in so doing, as-
sisted the state in its responsibility to protect those citizens. On the other hand, state
militias were designed to provide those same citizens with the functional power and
organization to resist government overreaching. This delicate but critical duality of
militia purpose is codified in the Second Amendment: militias are “necessary” not
only to ensure the “security” of each state but also to ensure the states are “free.”37 To
accomplish the full panoply of their purposes, militia members must be free to judge
when to obey government directives as lawful and when to disobey them as tyrannical
or overreaching. State militias must be capable of being subordinate to and independ-
ent of government.
1. Militias’ Unique Relationship to Government Arises from the Colonizing
Agencies’ Need for Militias
This creates obvious tension for governments that seek to use militias for their
desired purposes—governments (particularly the national government) prefer reliable,
absolute militia obedience to accomplish their domestic-defense, domestic-security, and
emergency-response goals. Governments simply do not value the check-on-tyranny
function of state militias, as history reveals: the national government’s efforts to exert
greater control over state militias, particularly in the late nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies, effectively emasculated them as meaningful checks on government overreaching.
34 Id. at 31.
35 Id.
36 See id.
37 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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Like their ancestor The Great Fyrd, early American colonial militias primarily were
citizen-directed, citizen-staffed, and citizen-funded entities, often out of necessity.38
When most countries in Europe abandoned the feudal levy and organized standing
armies for defense, the private groups that founded early American settlements received
no military assistance from their respective monarchies.39 Without a government to
fund their defenses—and without a preexisting defense or security infrastructure—
those colonizing entities had no other option but to rely on citizens to provide defense
and security for their colonies.40 From their genesis, American militias were not mere
tools of the government, but rather partners in providing essential services for citizens.
That unique organic relationship helps explain the unique authority militias earned and
retained. Although each of the thirteen British Colonies maintained its own, independ-
ent militia system,41 all thirteen militias embraced this special relationship between
militia and government.
Some state militias included both organized and unorganized components, the
latter of which included those who were expected to fulfill militia duty in time of need
even if not currently actively engaged in it or specifically called upon to do so.42 Gov-
ernments often relied on militia members to respond to unanticipated emergencies
sua sponte—for example, in response to sudden attacks by Native Americans—as well
as to requests from governors or other government authorities.43 Indeed, American ef-
forts to resist the British advance into Concord during the Revolutionary War would
have failed were it not for a group of unorganized citizens who, without government
direction, came together as a fighting force to repel the British troops.44
2. Early State Militias Enjoyed Flexibility To Specialize Their Forces To
Maximize Efficiency and Effectiveness
Before the Constitution, militias benefitted from the flexibility that decentralized
colonial and later state control provided, because they could specialize their forces to
38 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 6, 14, 15, 20; Whisker, supra note 3, at 952.
39 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 2; supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
40 By their terms, the charters issued to the agencies and groups who founded the British
Colonies foreshadowed that citizens would bear significant—and, initially, primary—
responsibility for domestic defense and security. MAHON, supra note 4, at 14 (noting that
charters authorized colonizing representatives “to assemble Marshal Array and put in
Warlike posture the inhabitants of said colony” and that the militias were the “backbone of
colonial defense”). The colonists themselves understood the critical role militias played: even
Pennsylvania, with its influential, peaceful Quaker population and its relatively good relations
with Native Americans, ultimately created a militia force in the 1700s. See DOUBLER &
LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 5. Often, those charters provided the agencies and groups’ repre-
sentatives explicit authority to effect that duty. See MAHON, supra note 4, at 14.
41 See Whisker, supra note 3, at 956.
42 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 44-1 (2012) (noting discrete organized and unorganized
classes of state militia).
43 MAHON, supra note 4, at 19.
44 Id. at 36.
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address their communities’ unique needs (for example, Massachusetts’s Minute Men).45
When frontier colonies faced different challenges (and lacked the population density
and infrastructural advantages of their coastal counterparts), they developed ranger
units better suited to patrolling vast frontiers and identifying and proactively thwarting
Native American threats before they could jeopardize the fledgling settlements.46 Those
frontier militia members typically engaged in security and defense activities more often
than their urban counterparts, but they frequently did so in less organized form, often
as ad hoc groups.47 The decentralized government control over militias enabled those
militias to serve the needs of their citizens best and adapt their forces accordingly.
Similarly, as early as the first half of the 1700s in some states, militias began local
community patrols designed to address internal concerns, not external threats.48 In some
of those states, patrols—not defense responsibilities—became the “primary mission”
of the militia.49 Militias, therefore, had the nimbleness and flexibility to remake them-
selves and to respond promptly to radical changes in their communities’ needs.
3. The Constitution and the Militia Act of 1792 Provide Limited National Control
over State Militia Members
The birth of the United States brought changes in the relationship between militias
and government: as the country’s military structure and efforts became centralized and
nationalized, the need for a stronger, unified, and more flexible military force emerged.
In the constitutional debates, the Framers and delegates ultimately were more con-
cerned with foreign enemies than with the threat of the national military overreach-
ing, and the ratified Constitution contained a legal basis for maintaining a standing
national army that could reliably defend the country against those external threats.50
45 DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 4, 6. That select group was typically composed of
the youngest, most able, and most politically active members of the militia; they were expected
to have their arms, ammunition, and other supplies ready for response at a minute’s notice.
See Michael A. McDonnell, Popular Mobilization and Political Culture in Revolutionary
Virginia: The Failure of the Minutemen and the Revolution from Below, 85 J. AM. HIST. 946,
963 (1998); Andrew Ronemus, Independence Hall Ass’n, Minutemen, USHISTORY.ORG,
http://www.ushistory.org/people/minutemen.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). Those citizens
not only played a pivotal role in military conflicts like the Revolutionary War, but they also
made the militia more nimble and responsive to community needs on a day-to-day basis. See
DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 4, 8–9.
46 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 6.
47 MAHON, supra note 4, at 56.
48 SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND THE
CAROLINAS 3, 30–32 (2001) (describing the participation of state militias in slave patrols,
which were designed to limit the movement and association of groups of slaves).
49 MAHON, supra note 4, at 22. Although the vast majority of militia duty fell on male
citizens, patrols were one of the rare responsibilities in which women were expected to
participate. See id.
50 Id. at 48–49.
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It also provided the national government some control over state militias, though that
power ostensibly was limited. Congress could call state militias to federal service, but
for only three purposes: “[T]o execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections
and repel Invasions.”51 Congress had the authority to organize, arm, and discipline
militias.52 States retained the power to appoint officers of their respective militias and
to train their citizen soldiers within the framework prescribed by Congress.53 And, of
course, the Second Amendment famously recognized the unique importance of the
state militias, stating that “[a] well regulated Militia” is “necessary to the security of
a free State,” and protecting “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms.”54
The Militia Act of 179255 followed, with the goal of “establishing an [sic] Uniform
Militia throughout the United States.”56 Those acts, like the Constitution, provided
Congress the authority to summon state militias into federal service for the same three
purposes enumerated in the Constitution: to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress
insurrections, and to repel invasion.57 By limiting the grounds for national control of
state militias, the Militia Act of 1792 attempted to reinforce militias’ character as pri-
marily a state, rather than federal, force.58 But the Act also recognized that enhanced
national involvement in militias was necessary to transform them into a more effec-
tive military force capable of engaging opponents on a national level.59
To provide the national government with the militia capabilities it desired, the
Militia Act of 1792 did three key things: it (1) defined the composition of the state
militias, (2) required members to provide their own arms and supplies, and (3) estab-
lished a unified command structure for the militias.
First, the Act stated that all “free able-bodied” white males of age eighteen and
under the age of forty-five were members of their respective state militia.60 That defini-
tion of militia largely overlapped states’ existing definitions of their militias, although
some states incorporated older males as well.61 In so doing, the law largely eliminated
51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; MAHON, supra note 4, at 49.
52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16; MAHON, supra note 4, at 49.
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16; MAHON, supra note 4, at 49.
54 U.S. CONST. amend. II. As one author put it, “[i]n 1791 the passage of the Second
Amendment guaranteed ‘the right of the people to keep and bear arms’ as the best way of
maintaining a ‘well regulated Militia’ against the possible abuses of a strong federal govern-
ment gone awry.” DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 18 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. II).
55 Militia Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271 (repealed by Act of Feb. 28, 1795,
ch.39, 1 Stat. 424).
56 MAHON, supra note 4, at 52.
57 John F. Romano, State Militias and the United States: Changed Responsibilities for
a New Era, 56 A.F. L. REV. 233, 241 (2005); Whisker, supra note 3, at 963.
58 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, 18.
59 See id.
60 § 1, 1 Stat. at 271; MAHON, supra note 4, at 52. By defining militia duty to include men
of age eighteen to those under forty-five, Congress was attempting to ensure the national
government had the most militarily capable militia members at its disposal.
61 See, e.g., DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 5; Robert H. Churchill, Gun
Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in Early America: The Legal
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state-exclusive militias by transforming the most capable core of state militia members
into potential dual-enlistment militia members who owed fidelity to two distinct sov-
ereigns: state and nation.62 Second, the Act required militia members to furnish them-
selves with proper firearms and other materials essential to fulfill their militia duty.63
It was not enough for militia members simply to show up for service, as one called to
participate in the standing army, nor could they expect the government to provide them
with arms (as some early colonial militias did, when no standing army existed);64 when
called, militia members were expected to be prepared with the arms and supplies they
needed to be effective.65 Third, the Act dictated how state militias would be divided into
units, with adjutant generals from each state overseeing the divisions.66
Although the Militia Act of 1792 provided the national government the authority
to exert control over the state militia members, in the following years, militia members
served their states far more than they served the national government.67
The potential divided loyalties created by the Militia Act of 1792's dual-sovereign
control over state militia members came to a head in the War of 1812, when a number
of state militias refused to respond to what they perceived was an unconstitutional call
to service.68 And despite attempts to smoothly integrate militias into the standing army
structure, their different levels of training, expectations of one another, and commitment
to the military effort vis-à-vis their other community obligations bred mutual contempt,
at times hindering the war effort.69
4. Additional Federal Laws Cement the National Government’s Actual or
De Facto Control over All State Militias
The final steps toward full national control over state militias began as the Civil
War began. In the Suppression of the Rebellion Act of 1861,70 now codified at 10
U.S.C. § 332, the federal government increased the President’s authority to call any
state militia “to enforce the faithful execution of the laws of the United States, or to
suppress . . . rebellion” in any state where the laws were “forcibly opposed” or the
Context of the Second Amendment, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 139, 145 (2007). The federal militia
excluded older individuals precisely because it did not feel they were best suited to militia
duty. In this way, the national government sought to secure the cream of the militia crop.
62 MAHON, supra note 4, at 52.
63 § 1, 1 Stat. at 271.
64 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 16–17.
65 § 1, 1 Stat. at 271.
66 § 3, 1 Stat. at 272; DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 18.
67 MAHON, supra note 4, at 53, 61.
68 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 20; MAHON, supra note 4, at 67. That war
also revealed that, despite the Act’s reforms, militias were still inconsistent as a supplement to
and substitute for regular military professionals. See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 20.
69 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 20.
70 Act of July 29, 1861, ch. 25, § 1, 12 Stat. 281 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 332
(2006)).
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execution of those laws was “forcibly obstructed,” expanding the power originally
provided under the Militia Act of 1792.71 Under Section 332, if the President believes
a state militia is needed to enforce any federal law or quell any civil unrest, he may
call and control that militia even if its members are not, by definition, part of the exist-
ing federal militia.72 Given the vast array of federal laws and the number of citizen
protests that could be considered forcible opposition to or obstruction of federal laws,
the national government has a plethora of potential bases for calling state militias to
serve on behalf of the nation. Thus, no state militia can consider itself truly independent
of national control; at just about any time in modern America, the federal government
would have a good argument, somewhere in the nation, that it could use additional
manpower to assist its domestic-security efforts to better enforce the laws—for ex-
ample, by increasing the number of border guards or by increasing patrols of high-
drug-crime areas.
The Militia Act of 1903,73 also known as the First Dick Act, substantially in-
creased direct federal control over state militias.74 It established a federal militia that
is bifurcated into two “classes.”75 The federal Organized Militia was defined as the
National Guard and the Naval Militia, and its members served both the national and
state governments and thus were true dual-enlistment militia members.76 The federal
Unorganized Militia included all males aged seventeen to forty-five who were not
members of the Organized Militia.77 Thus, every male in that age range was a federal
militiaman regardless of whether he served in his state militia.
Increased federal control and regulation of organized state militias meant increased
federal funding and the guarantee that state militias would serve an important role in
future national military affairs.78 In exchange, the state militias in their form as the
National Guard were required to organize and structure themselves in line with the
national military’s structure (allowing them to be integrated more seamlessly with their
full-time military counterparts) and were required to attend more rigorous, consistent,
military-focused training, for which militia members received federal compensation.79
No longer were active state militia members operating out of civic duty, focusing pri-
marily on serving the citizens of their state; now they were expected to serve both
nation and state, they trained primarily for their national defense responsibilities, and
71 Id. That power has remained virtually unchanged since the outset of the Civil War. See
10 U.S.C. § 332 (2006).
72 See § 332.
73 See Act of Jan. 21, 1903, ch. 196, § 1, 32 Stat. 775.
74 See Romano, supra note 57, at 242–43; Whisker, supra note 3, at 967.
75 § 1, 32 Stat. at 775.
76 See 10 U.S.C. § 311(b)(1); § 4, 32 Stat. at 776.
77 10 U.S.C. § 311.
78 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 141. In the thirteen years after the First Dick Act, the
national government contributed fifty-three million dollars to the now dual-enlistment state
militias, more than all its aggregate contributions to the state militias before 1903. See id.
79 32 Stat. at 775, 777–78.
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they owed much to their national government. The flexibility and customizability that
served state militias well historically was forfeited in favor of consistent structure and
improved military capability. In short, the National Guard after the First Dick Act
began to look very much like the standing military forces: members received similar
training with a national military focus, militias were organized similarly (and in accord
with the national government’s desires), members were compensated by the national
government, and members could be called into national service.80 Nevertheless, they
shared three key characteristics of historical state militia: they were not full-time sol-
diers, the length of their federal service was limited (at that time, to nine months), and
they could not be called to serve outside the United States.81
The Second Dick Act,82 in 1908, further blurred the distinctions between the
National Guard and the full-time military forces. The nine-month restriction on fed-
eral service was eliminated, as was the geographical prohibition against international
service.83 Under the new law, the President had the authority to dictate the length and
location of service, just as he could dictate those terms for the full-time military.84 The
Second Dick Act brought even more federal funding, but the amounts were not suf-
ficient to provide all the military supplies and training the federal laws imposed on the
dual-enlistment militias, so the relative usefulness of state militias for national mili-
tary service was still dictated in large part by each state’s investments in its now dual-
enlistment militia.85 A 1911 Judge Advocate General opinion and an Attorney General
opinion the following year concluded that the Second Dick Act provisions that pro-
vided plenary authorization for the President to call the militia to serve in foreign lands
were unconstitutional.86 Militia service on foreign land was permissible only if it satis-
fied one of the three purposes outlined in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution: “to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”87
For all practical purposes, the federal government wrested near complete control
of state militias in the National Defense Act of 1916.88 That Act gave the President
80 Id. §§ 3, 4, 14, 18, 32 Stat. at 775, 777–79; Romano, supra note 57, at 242–43; Whisker,
supra note 3, at 967.
81 §§ 1, 4, 5, 32 Stat. at 775–76; MAHON, supra note 4, at 140.
82 Act of May 27, 1908, ch. 204, §§ 4–5, 35 Stat. 399.
83 §§ 4–5, 35 Stat. at 400; DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 56; MAHON, supra note
4, at 142.
84 §§ 4–5, 35 Stat. at 400; MAHON, supra note 4, at 142.
85 William M. Donnelly, The Root Reforms and the National Guard, U.S. ARMY CENTER
MIL. HIST. (May 3, 2001), http://www.history.army.mil/documents/1901/Root-NG.htm.
86 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 142; see also Authority of President to Send Militia into
a Foreign Country, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 322, 324, 329 (1912).
87 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; see also Authority of President to Send Militia into a
Foreign Country, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 322, 323–24 (1912). Thus, for example, it was accept-
able to call militias to defend territories governed by U.S. law but not to serve as an army of
occupation in a foreign land. See id.
88 National Defense Act, ch. 134, 39 Stat. 166 (1916).
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extraordinary control over the dual-enlistment militias, including the authority to dictate
the type and composition of National Guard units maintained by each state;89 assign
National Guard units to whichever division, brigade, or unit he chose;90 and select offi-
cers from either the National Guard or the regular army to command the units.91 States
were severely restricted in their ability to control their now dual-enlistment militias;
they were required to maintain minimum numbers of troops in their respective National
Guard units, and no state was permitted to maintain its own troops outside its National
Guard militias.92
Although a state was permitted to use its National Guard members when they were
not being used by the federal government (for example, outside of wartime and out-
side the members’ extensive National Guard training requirements), the Act funda-
mentally altered the balance of federal-state control over the states’ organized militias.
States could not dictate the type of National Guard units they would maintain, their
leadership or structure, or their size.93 And whenever the national government believed
it needed to use the militia to execute its laws, suppress insurrections, or repel inva-
sions, the states had no practical way to replace those forces en masse in an organized
manner.94 State militias no longer were independent (or even state-focused) entities
and no longer served any meaningful check on tyranny by the national government
generally or its military specifically.95 And by the latter decades of the twentieth cen-
tury, the national government provided virtually all of the dual-enlistment Guard’s
expenses and effectively had complete control over the dual-enlistment militias.96
89 Id. §§ 58, 60, 39 Stat. at 197.
90 Id. §§ 64–65, 39 Stat. at 198–99.
91 Id.
92 Id. §§ 61–62, 39 Stat. at 198.
93 Id. §§ 60, 62, 65, 39 Stat. at 197–99, 208.
94 See id.; see also MAHON, supra note 4, at 156–57 (noting the large-scale use of the
National Guard in federal service).
95 A number of subsequent federal laws allowed the President to exert even more control over
dual-enlistment National Guard units more easily, including the National Guard Mobilization
Act of 1933 (which makes the National Guard a component of the Army), ch. 87, 48 Stat.
153, and the Montgomery Amendment (which severely limited governors’ control over their
states’ Guard units), Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 522, 100 Stat. 3871 (1986) (codified at 10 U.S.C.
§ 12301(f) (2006)).
96 MAHON, supra note 4, at 246–47. Even though national control and financial support
were purportedly designed to ensure state militias had the resources they needed to operate
effectively, the National Guard still was inadequately capitalized in the early twentieth century.
See Donnelly, supra note 85 (discussing the financial situation of the Guard in the early twen-
tieth century). As the Industrial Revolution progressed, the National Guard found itself more
frequently used to protect the interests of private corporate entities like railroads. See MAHON,
supra note 4, at 113, 117–18. And because the Guard was so essential to the security of those
entities, they began funding the Guard to ensure their own protection. See id. at 113. Private
contributions were so substantial in some states that they constituted the primary source of rev-
enue for those state Guard units. See id. (noting that, for a decade, the Pennsylvania National
Guard’s primary funding came from private, not governmental, entities).
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Concerned with tight national control over state militias through the National
Guard and the absence of any meaningful independent state forces, citizens in a num-
ber of states initiated efforts to resurrect putatively independent state militias. As the
twentieth century wound to a close, those citizens began establishing militias known
as State Defense Forces (SDFs), which are authorized under federal law.97 Today, SDFs
exist in some form in twenty-two states.98 These SDFs do not differ much from their
National Guard counterparts: they provide essentially the same services as National
Guardsmen (with a similar military focus), and they frequently are staffed with former
military or National Guard members.99 They are distinguishable from Guard units to
the extent they are not subject to the structure and training imposed by the national
government, and they do not receive federal resources (and often lack meaningful state
funding).100 Despite those distinctions, however, SDFs still are subject to national
control. Although they cannot be called to active duty military service, they may be
called by the President for domestic national militia duty because they qualify as state
militias.101 Thus, no truly independent state militia currently exists with the flexibil-
ity to serve its state’s unique domestic-security and emergency-response needs or the
independence to serve as a meaningful check on government tyranny.
C. Core Functions of State Militias
Militia duty, at its core, is the responsibility to defend one’s community from inter-
nal and external threats. To that end, state militias and their colonial predecessors typi-
cally served the following core functions: (1) domestic defense; (2) domestic security
and emergency response; and (3) a check on government overreaching and tyranny.
1. Domestic Defense
When imported to the American colonies in the 1600s, militias’ primary function
was domestic defense, consistent with their European roots.102 At the militias’ genesis,
colonial agencies provided basic start-up assistance because militia members generally
had no professional military experience and lacked many necessary resources and
97 See 32 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2006).
98 Brent C. Bankus, State Defense Forces, an Untapped Homeland Defense Asset, STATE
DEFENSE FORCE MONOGRAPH SERIES 25, 42 (2005), available at http://www.minutemaninstitute
.org/writing-program/SDF.pdf.
99 Id. at 25, 31, 36–37.
100 Id. at 25, 38–39, 41.
101 See 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2006); 32 U.S.C. § 109(c).
102 England’s Great Fyrd, comprised of self-trained individuals who used whatever weapons
they already owned or could easily acquire, enjoyed success as a domestic-defense force—for
example, when it was called to defend England from the Dutch invasion of 1016. See MAHON,
supra note 4, at 6.
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supplies.103 Native American threats prompted quick establishment and organization
of persistent militia forces for domestic defense, as conflicts with Native Americans
began shortly after settlers landed at Jamestown in 1607.104 Colonial militia members
performed well in the domestic-defense context.105 They were particularly valuable to
the fledgling colonies because they could mobilize a large number of armed citizens
on short notice when the colonies lacked the financial and manpower resources nec-
essary to maintain a large standing army.106
However, even when militias served as the primary combat force, they were not
a true substitute for a full-time, unrestricted professional military, given the signifi-
cant limitations on active militia duty—most notably, geographic and temporal re-
strictions that acknowledged the other responsibilities of the part-time, as-needed
militia members.107 Each militia served exclusively in a defensive capacity and was
used only in close proximity to the area it was responsible for defending (usually
limited to the respective colonial or state boundaries).108 Members’ length of active
service was limited, so militias’ continuity of experience and teamwork—as well as
corporate memory—could be similarly limited.109 When called to active duty, early
militia members typically were expected to serve no longer than three months at a
time.110 Limitations on active militia duty ensured colonies could muster sufficient
103 See id. at 15. Some agencies initially hired professional soldiers to lead, instruct, and
train militia members for their defense-related duties until those militia members were self-
sufficient. See id. Moreover, England sent arms to supplement the colonists’ supplies, and the
Virginia legislature imposed additional taxes to buy additional arms and equipment for its
militia members. DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 3; see also MAHON, supra note 4,
at 14 (stating that it was “necessary for each colony to see that its citizen soldiers had arms and
received training”).
104 On March 22, 1622, a coordinated attack by Native Americans that killed more than
300 English settlers in a day prompted greater community and government investment in state
militias. DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
105 See Whisker, supra note 3, at 956.
106 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 1–4; see also MAHON, supra note 4, at 10
(discussing the idea that militias were born out of a need for cheap security).
107 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 19; Whisker, supra note 3, at 955 (“The militias usually
served for short periods of time, commonly sixty days or less.”).
108 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 9. There were a few exceptions: South Carolina’s militia
could be used outside borders until the state assembly prohibited it in 1690; North Carolina’s
militia could be used in South Carolina and Georgia. Id.
109 See id.
110 Id.; Whisker, supra note 3, at 955. The length-of-service restriction protected the fiscal
well-being of militia members perhaps even more than the geographical restriction: a majority
of militia members were farmers, and they relied on their own labor for production and, ulti-
mately, economic survival, so extended time away from the farm could be financially crippling.
MAHON, supra note 4, at 19. Practically speaking, the three-month active-duty limitation also
reinforced the geographic limitations of the militia as well as its role as a purely defensive
force. See id. Given the absence of modern forms of transportation, three months was not
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defenses with minimal dislocation of society or disruption to economies in their
infancy; however, those same limitations created operational weaknesses when those
militias faced sizable external threats capable of coordinated, geographically unre-
stricted attacks.111 For example, in many instances, militia members were unwilling
to leave their home colony to participate in military exercises that extended beyond
a single colony’s borders.112 George Washington’s military campaign in 1754, at the
outset of the French and Indian War, is illustrative: it was notably disastrous in large
part because he could not use the Virginia militia in Ohio County, which arguably lay
outside the boundaries of Virginia.113 Washington’s struggle in that campaign reflected
core limitations of the colonial militia system in the military context, which carried
over to later state militia systems: militias were not interchangeable, and they lacked
the nationwide agility, cross-border reach, and offensive capability necessary to serve
as true substitutes for a national, full-time military force.114
Despite those limitations, early colonial militias in New England were essential
to the colonists’ victory in two wars involving Native Americans, thus establishing the
militias’ domestic-defense capabilities.115 Militias also played an important and posi-
tive role in Britain’s military efforts in the French and Indian War.116 In fact, the col-
onists claimed their militia members were “the prime mover[s] in driving the French
from North America.”117 And numerous Revolutionary War generals, like George
enough time for many continuous or distant military operations—particularly offensive oper-
ations that often faced a high degree of uncertainty of success. See id.
111 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 58 (detailing some of the weaknesses created by limitations
on active military duty).
112 Whisker, supra note 3, at 955 (“When service would take [militia members] out of their
own immediate areas, they usually balked at accepting service.”).
113 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 19.
114 Id.; Whisker, supra note 3, at 958 (noting that “Washington lamented the lack of dis-
cipline and dedication of the militia and demanded that a real, trained army be formed”). As
a result, some colonies experimented with ad hoc groups of “provincial” troops for military
operations requiring extended time commitments or travel outside colonial borders. DOUBLER
& LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 7.
115 In the Pequot War, Pequot Indians raided colonies, killed dozens of colonists, and
kidnapped others. A force made up primarily of colonial militia members, supported by other
Native American allies, attacked and ultimately defeated the Pequots completely after the
Mystic Massacre and Fairfield Swamp Fight. See 1637—The Pequot War, SOC’Y COLONIAL
WARS ST. CONN., http://www.colonialwarsct.org/1637.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2013). King
Philip’s War, proportionately one of the bloodiest and costliest wars in North American history,
ended when a party led by Plymouth militia members and Native American allies tracked down
King Philip, a Native American leader also known as Metacom or Metacomet, and killed him.
Philip Gould, Research Note, Reinventing Benjamin Church: Virtue, Citizenship and the
History of King Philip’s War in Early National America, 16 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 645, 645,
647 (1996); 1675—King Philip’s War, SOC’Y COLONIAL WARS ST. CONN., http://www
.colonialwarsct.org/1675.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
116 DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 7.
117 MAHON, supra note 4, at 30.
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Washington and Philip Schuyler, gained critical military knowledge and experience
while serving as militia officers during the French and Indian War.118 However, the
geographical and temporal limitations on militia duty caused friction between militia
members and some professional soldiers, who expected their citizen counterparts to
meet their professional military standards.119
Throughout the Revolutionary War, military leaders’ opinions about militias re-
mained mixed at best. Foreign commanders like Charles Lee and Horatio Gates (British
officers before joining the Continental Army), and Lafayette and Rochambeau gener-
ally were favorable,120 while some American commanders like George Washington fre-
quently complained about many militia members’ lack of professional-grade discipline
and fortitude in the fog of war.121 Although Washington and others were concerned
about the extent to which Congress was relying on the militias in the war effort, they
ultimately had to depend on militias to succeed militarily, and they used them effec-
tively despite their misgivings.122 Indeed, Virginia militia members were members
of a coalition force also including Continental Army soldiers, French troops, and
French seamen that ultimately surrounded British forces and obtained their surrender
at Yorktown in 1781.123
The revolutionary-era relationship between the standing army and militias was
strained, reflecting the contemporaneous debates on federalism, the diverse opinions
118 Id.
119 For example, when General James Wolfe captured Quebec in the final campaign of the
French and Indian War while serving with six companies of colonial militia members, he
described them as “the dirtiest, most contemptible cowardly dog[s] you can conceive.” Id.
120 Id. at 43–44.
121 Apparently, Washington did not believe militia members met the high standards estab-
lished by full-time American soldiers. He stated: “Being subject to no control themselves, they
introduce disorder among the troops . . . while change in living brings on sickness; this makes
them impatient to get home . . . and introduces abominable desertions.” Id. at 43 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Nathaniel Greene opined that “[p]eople coming from home with
all the tender feelings of domestic life are not sufficiently fortified with natural courage to
stand the shocking scenes of war.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). He believed that
an effective soldier needed to be hardened and desensitized to these scenes: “‘[T]o march over
dead men, to hear without concern the groans of the wounded, I say few men can stand such
scenes unless steeled by habit and fortified by military pride’”—presumably a pride reserved
only for full-time soldiers. Id. But it was precisely that hardened, military-focused attitude—
that community concerns should yield to concerns of war—that made citizens wary of profes-
sional soldiers. See id. at 42–43 (discussing fears of a standing army).
122 Id. at 37, 43 (noting Washington’s claim that “[t]he dependence which Congress have
placed upon [the militias] I fear will totally ruin our cause” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
123 Id. at 41. Even after the Continental Congress created a Continental Army to serve dur-
ing 1776, state militias participated in nearly all of the War’s battles. DOUBLER & LISTMAN,
supra note 2, at 12; MAHON, supra note 4, at 38 (noting, for example, that 2,700 local militia
were part of a 5,600-soldier force led by Major General Charles Lee that defended Charleston,
South Carolina, from British attack in 1776).
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about the scope of power an effective national government should wield, and the
public’s willingness to sacrifice military effectiveness to reduce the potential for gov-
ernment overreaching and avoid the high costs that came with large standing military
forces.124 Under the Articles of Confederation, militia members made up the core of the
post-revolutionary Continental Army.125 But a series of inconsistent military perfor-
mances by state militias called into question their role as the primary national military
force for the new nation.
The Militia Act of 1792 was designed to address the state militias’ inconsistent
military performance; the ultimate goal of the law, from Washington’s perspective,
was to create a strong, reliable national military reserve he could call into action when
necessary to provide domestic defense.126 Nevertheless, the War of 1812 revealed that
the Act did not achieve its goal of consistent, reliable military performance by state
militias.127 State militias performed well in a number of circumstances: the Maryland
militia performed particularly well when led by Major General Samuel Smith, who
adamantly resisted federal command.128 Additionally, Major General Andrew Jackson
demonstrated one of the best uses of the militia at the Battle of New Orleans, which
was the final major battle of the War of 1812 and is widely considered to be the great-
est land victory of the war.129 But poor results were not uncommon: militias in New
York and Washington, D.C., turned in anemic performances that allowed British forces
to loot Buffalo and Plattsburgh, New York, as well as to move into Washington, D.C.,
and burn public buildings with little resistance.130
124 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 48. Based on the colonists’ concerns about the threats posed
by maintaining a large professional military force, Congress moved to disband the Continental
Army soon after the conclusion of the war. DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 16–17.
125 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 46–47.
126 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 52; Whisker, supra note 3, at 958. Because the militias’
military capability was of paramount concern, the Act’s restructuring of the militias did not par-
ticularly consider state militias’ domestic-security and emergency-response roles independent
of their domestic-defense role. Nor did it adequately consider the need for independent state
militias as a check on government tyranny. See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 53
(discussing how concerns over “calls for increases in the size of the Regular Army” in the
early 1900s prompted Congress to absorb state militias into the National Guard to serve these
roles); MAHON, supra note 4, at 53; Whisker, supra note 3, at 964.
127 See, e.g., DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 20–21. Action in Bladensburg,
Maryland, aptly demonstrated this inconsistency on a micro level. In a battle against over-
whelming odds at Bladensburg, Maryland, a number of militia units stood strong with full-
time soldiers until they ultimately were overrun by British forces. However, “a majority of the
[militia members] retreated with such ease that the action became known as the ‘Bladensburg
Races.’” Id. at 21; see also MAHON, supra note 4, at 73.
128 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 73. Militia members responded in huge numbers to the
call to service, militia snipers killed a British general, and the militia ultimately repelled the
British invasion of Baltimore. Id.
129 See id. at 76–77.
130 DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 20–21; MAHON, supra note 4, at 71, 73.
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Although some state militias proved indispensable in the War of 1812, their high-
profile successes likely created false expectations regarding the continued use of militia
in high-pressure military engagements and erroneously justified Americans’ belief (and
desire to believe) that paying for and equipping a larger, more powerful standing army
was unnecessary to provide effective military capabilities for the fledgling nation.131
After the War of 1812, the national government failed to make any meaningful invest-
ment in the militias, despite its increased control over them and its desire to standardize
the militias’ structure to facilitate their use in national military service.132 The disci-
pline, structure, organization, and resources so necessary to the militias’ effectiveness
as a reliable, consistent defense force—the very things the Militia Act of 1792 was
designed to address—began to atrophy absent government support and direction.133
Nevertheless, state militias’ greatest military contributions likely came during
the Civil War—again the result of necessity. All told, more than eighty percent of the
Confederate Army and ninety-six percent of the Union Army entered service as vol-
unteer state militia members.134 Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century,
state militias proved critical to U.S. military efforts in at least four wars, including
the Spanish-American War.135
Fundamental changes in federal law in the early twentieth century helped the na-
tional government exert greater control over state militias to make them more military-
focused and easier to integrate into the existing professional military structure.136 The
National Guard concept presented an apparently attractive compromise for proponents
131 DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 22; MAHON, supra note 4, at 77. Some inter-
preted Jackson’s victory in New Orleans to suggest any American part-time citizen-soldier
could serve effectively in place of a full-time soldier, despite minimal training. DOUBLER &
LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 22. The victory also created a false sense of security, suggesting the
nation could draw together a large fighting force at or around the moment of need, without
elaborate and expensive training or necessary logistical forethought. Id.
132 MAHON, supra note 4, at 80–81.
133 Id. at 79–81.
134 Jerry Cooper, Militia and National Guard, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN
MILITARY HISTORY 440, 441 (John W. Chambers II ed., 1999). State militias proved essential
to both sides’ military efforts: in 1861, President Lincoln called 75,000 militia members into
federal service; after an unexpected loss at Bull Run, he called 500,000 more for the war effort.
DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 34, 38. On the other hand, volunteer state militias were
the primary forces through which Southern states seized control of federal forts, arsenals,
customs houses, and mints. Id. at 34. State militia members participated in virtually every
facet of the Civil War and were essential in holding the country together and, ultimately, en-
suring the Union’s success. Id. at 41. The fact that an overwhelming majority of both Union
and Confederate forces were militia members who returned to their jobs and communities
immediately after the war helps explain the unique persistence of the conflict in the United
States’ cultural psyche. MAHON, supra note 4, at 107.
135 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at ch. 2; supra notes 121–23, 127–30, 134 and
accompanying text.
136 See supra Part I.B.4.
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and opponents of a strong national government. Because National Guardsmen were not
full-time soldiers—rather, they were dual-enlistment federal/state militia members—
they did not present the same perceived risk of tyranny as direct enlargement of the
regular military forces, which had been proposed.137 However, because they were sub-
ject to an enhanced, standardized, and nationalized training regimen designed to make
them military-ready on a national (and international) scale, they were more efficiently
and effectively integrated into the national military forces in time of need, and their
military success improved with greater national control over finances, structure, leader-
ship, and training.138 From the latter part of the twentieth century to the present, state
militias in their National Guard form have consistently performed at high levels in mili-
tary roles including domestic defense, approximating or matching the performance
of full-time professionals and playing a significant role in two world wars and other
military conflicts large and small.139
2. Domestic Security and Emergency Response
Although colonial militias’ primary focus initially was domestic defense, they
quickly expanded their responsibilities, establishing their value in the domestic-security
and emergency-response contexts as early as the seventeenth century.140 Those early
American militias provided hybrid border security/police patrols, organized multi-
ple daily community watches, and developed systems to alert citizens to imminent
threats—many responsibilities now handled by states’ (and their localities’) modern-
day police forces and first responders.141 As a general matter, colonial militias—and
later state militias—had the flexibility to refocus and expand their efforts as commu-
nity needs required: they turned out whenever police were unable to maintain order,
manned coastal forts, guarded criminals, and enforced quarantines in the event of
infectious diseases.142
137 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 107 & ch. 10.
138 Id. at 148–49.
139 See generally DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 59–91. The notable exception is
the Vietnam War, when—in contrast with prior and subsequent military engagements—
President Lyndon Johnson did not use the National Guard extensively, due primarily to
political concerns. See id. at 110–14. During that period, the military character of the Guard
changed fundamentally; citizens then sought it as a safe haven from military combat, and it
was oversubscribed above federal authorization levels. MAHON, supra note 4, at 243–44.
140 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 4–7. Connecticut’s charter, for example,
noted that its militia’s responsibilities were not limited to defense activities against purely
external threats, but also included responding to internal threats. MAHON, supra note 4, at
14 (noting that Connecticut’s militia members “were authorized to ‘expulse repell and resist
by force of Arms . . . and also to kill slay destroy by all fitting ways . . . all and every Person
or Persons as shall attempt the destruction invasion detriment or annoyance of the . . .
Inhabitants’” (emphasis added)).
141 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 4, 6.
142 By the end of the eighteenth century, state militias proved critical to state governance
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Massachusetts pioneered the concept of militia specialization and used that flex-
ibility to refine its militia into a more nimble, responsive entity capable of handling
multiple threats and emergencies, in large part due to its unique Minutemen force.143
The Minutemen units proved particularly successful, and other militias copied the
concept of militia diversification and specialization that Massachusetts embraced.144
By the early eighteenth century, states regularly used militia members for much
more than typical military duty.145 Among other responsibilities, militias protected
communities from bandits and vigilantes, guarded prisoners, served as patrols, pre-
vented lynchings when unpopular executions were scheduled, had riot duty, helped
settle land-related disputes, and helped manage public ceremonies and parades, pro-
viding domestic security of the state.146 In those and other similar ways, state militias
emerged as key public servants: they were not merely temporary military fill-ins but
core components of states’ domestic-security and emergency-response systems when
state professionals lacked the capacity to address citizens’ needs adequately.
A few examples illustrate the breadth and diversity of state militias’ domestic-
security value: in the nineteenth century, the Washington, D.C., and Washington state
militias were so robust and effective in their domestic-security efforts that they virtually
substituted for professional police forces;147 New York’s 7th Regiment had a string
of important successes when serving in domestic-security and emergency-responses
roles;148 and Maine effectively used militias to protect its Canadian border.149 When
from multiple perspectives. MAHON, supra note 4, at 61 (noting that “indeed, the states could
not have carried on government without them”).
143 MAHON, supra note 4, at 36–38. In Massachusetts, one-third of their militia members
essentially were on call continuously, available to respond near-instantly to citizen concerns.
DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 4.
144 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 36. The Minutemen, who typically were the first into
battle because of their readiness, also played an important defensive role at the outset of the
Revolutionary War. Id. They engaged the British Army at Lexington when the British were
en route to Concord to confiscate colonial military stores. Id. Minutemen fired the famous shots
“heard round the world.” Id. Although the group that fired those shots did not successfully
slow the march of the British military, their fellow militia members at Concord did success-
fully repel the British, sending them retreating to Boston. DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2,
at 8–9; MAHON, supra note 4, at 36.
145 MAHON, supra note 4, at 85. Over the next century or so, as imminent threats to the
states waned, their militias’ domestic-security and emergency-response roles expanded. Id.
146 Id. at 61, 85.
147 Id. at 84, 115 (noting that Washington state militia succeeded in large part because it
frequently and successfully managed racial and labor-management conflicts).
148 Id. at 85. The 7th Regiment managed unrest during the 1834 elections, policed streets and
prevented looting after the great fire of 1835, stopped the dockworkers’ rampage of 1836, pro-
tected property from looting in 1837, and quelled the 1849 Opera House Mob. Id. at 85–86.
Likewise, a Pennsylvania militia company quelled the Philadelphia riots in 1833 and 1844, and
militia were used to quell the New York and Boston Civil War draft riots. Id. at 85, 103.
149 Id. at 90.
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organized militia units failed to, or were unable to, respond to internal threats—as with
the 1856 San Francisco riots—unorganized militia members filled in to provide the
necessary domestic security.150 Thus, state militias’ domestic-security and emergency-
response roles often approached—and arguably surpassed—the importance of their
domestic-defense role shortly after the Civil War.151
Throughout the twentieth century, state militias—before and after they were effec-
tively transformed into dual-enlistment National Guard units by federal law—continued
as an integral arm of governments’ domestic-security and emergency-response efforts.
Of particular note, those militias received substantial praise for domestic-security and
emergency-response assistance during disasters (both man-made and natural) like the
San Francisco earthquake of 1906.152 They helped control increasing numbers of
violent labor disputes like the 1934 San Francisco Longshore Strike.153 They further
proved their worth in riot control, including preventing racially motivated lynching
attempts and supporting racial integration efforts.154
Until the middle part of the twentieth century, when states began establishing their
own police forces en masse, state militias in their pre– and post–National Guard form
performed many of the responsibilities those police forces later assumed.155 After the
150 Id. at 82.
151 For example, governors called their militias 481 times to provide fundamental domestic-
security and emergency-response functions in a variety of contexts, including guarding and
transporting prisoners, preventing lynchings and quelling race riots, and responding to natural
disasters like fires and floods, among other tasks. See id. at 110–11.
152 Id. at 149, 176. “Within relatively a few hours, a vast metropolis had been reduced to
an area of indescribable devastation and destruction.” The Military and the San Francisco
Earthquake, 1906, CALIF. GUARDSMAN (Apr. 1927), available at http://www.militarymuseum
.org/1906CNG1.html. “The work done and still being done by the National Guard of California
will be long and gratefully remem bered [sic] by the people of San Francisco and the State. The
Minute Men and the Old Continentals were the National Guard of their day.” Id. (quoting an
editorial written shortly after the disaster).
153 MAHON, supra note 4, at 176. Striking San Francisco longshoremen were wounded and
killed in confrontations with police; violence would have continued, but California’s governor
ordered the California National Guard to patrol the area. DAVID F. SELVIN, A TERRIBLE ANGER:
THE 1934 WATERFRONT AND GENERAL STRIKES IN SAN FRANCISCO 147, 152 (1996). The
Guard’s presence essentially squashed the strike once the picketers realized “that retaliation
to police violence or to the Guard would be suicidal.” Id. at 153.
154 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 212. Among other incidents, militia members were called
to protect an African-American man seeking to live in a formerly all-white apartment building;
they were called fifteen times in Florida alone to prevent lynchings of African Americans;
they were used successfully to integrate schools in Clinton and Oliver Springs, Tennessee,
as well as Sturgis and Clay, Kentucky; they were called to support integration of the University
of Mississippi when federal marshals could not do the job; and they helped integrate the
University of Alabama and schools in Birmingham, Mobile, and Tuskegee, Alabama. MAHON,
supra note 4, at 149, 212–13, 224, 237–38.
155 See id. at 226. In some instances, this extended to wholesale confrontation with corrupt,
entrenched interests. For example, after the murder of a candidate for state office, Alabama
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establishment and proliferation of comprehensive state police forces, those militias
were freed to focus even more on emergency response, including rescue and relief
missions, which—unlike many domestic-security activities—made them popular with
the public.156 They responded to floods, wind damage, missing persons, urban and
forest fires, and snow emergencies; provided traffic and crowd control; and handled
major wrecks, among other missions.157
Despite militias’ expanded emergency-response duties and states’ and localities’
greater investments in police forces, the Civil Rights movement ensured state mili-
tias would continue to play a pivotal role in riot control and related domestic-security
activities. Despite the rare, but more publicized, examples of states attempting to use
the dual-enlistment Guard units to oppose racial integration, states frequently called
those militias to protect Civil Rights efforts and quell race riots. For example, in 1961,
Alabama Governor John Patterson called 800 Guardsmen to protect Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr.’s organized freedom ride from Selma, Alabama, to Birmingham, Alabama,
when federal marshals were overwhelmed by crowds opposing the demonstration.158
From 1965 to 1966 alone, Guardsmen managed race riots in the Hough District of
Cleveland, Ohio; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Dayton, Ohio; Watts in Los Angeles, Califor-
nia (twice); San Francisco, California; and Chicago, Illinois.159 Notably, King specifi-
cally praised the Guard’s response to the Chicago riots.160 During the Vietnam era, the
Guard frequently was used stateside to manage anti-war and other riots; from 1970 to
1973 alone, more than 233,000 Guardsmen were called 201 times to provide domestic
security within the United States.161
Near the end of the twentieth century, militias’ domestic-security efforts had been
reduced significantly as professional police forces grew in strength and number;162
nevertheless, they still were involved in emergency response and, in a number of nota-
ble instances in the late 1970s, filled in seamlessly for striking domestic-security and
called its Guard to raid a city infiltrated with criminals and corrupt officials; when the Guard
left, some of the crime returned, but the situation was much improved compared to the prior
environment. Id.
156 See id.
157 Id. at 246 (describing how militia members in New York helped dig New York City
out of the worst snowfall on record, Guard companies in Alaska used helicopters to drop
needed fuel for Eskimos, and militia members helped manage the aftermath of Hurricane
Carla, among other contributions). The popularity of these efforts coupled with heavy
advertising and publicization of the Guard increased enrollment from about 276,000 in 1954,
to 434,000 just three years later. Id. at 220 (noting that total enrollment in 1957 actually
exceeded the number authorized by federal law, resulting in a freeze in Guard recruitment).
158 Id. at 238.
159 Id. at 238–40.
160 Id. at 239.
161 Id. at 244, 246 (noting that, in May 1970 alone, Guardsmen were called “twenty-four
times at twenty-one different universities in sixteen states to control the rioting students”).
162 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
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emergency-response professionals—including firemen, policemen, and correctional
employees.163 Today, state militias in their National Guard form continue to provide
domestic-security and emergency-response assistance where needed, although the
national government’s recent emergency-response efforts have been criticized.164
3. Check on Government Overreaching and Tyranny
From their origin in America, colonial and later state militias have occupied a
unique place in the bundle of rights and responsibilities citizens possess. Because they
have domestic-defense, domestic-security, and emergency-response capabilities, mili-
tias have always been valuable assets to their governments. And because state militias
generally were composed of a broad cross-section of citizens performing part-time ser-
vices as opposed to paid government professionals (almost exclusively so until the
twentieth century brought true federalization and dual-enlistment), they were designed
to provide another core function: a check on tyranny.165 Militias limited the professional
military power at the government’s disposal and restricted its need and ability to tax
the citizens to maintain a large professional military force.166 And when governments
sought to take action that overstepped their authority, militias provided citizens and
their states a meaningful way to resist that perceived tyranny and prevented govern-
ments from using military force to effect that tyranny.167 Citizens valued relying on
militias instead of larger professional forces, even when that meant militias would be
less efficient or effective than their professional counterparts. Many government and
163 MAHON, supra note 4, at 258.
164 Id. at 241 (noting that, from the end of World War II until 1967, twenty-eight states
called more than 197,000 Guardsmen to provide essential domestic-security and emergency-
response services). Over the past half-century, militias have continued to respond to internal
and external threats in their capacity as state militiamen when called by their governors and
in their capacity as Guardsmen when called by the federal government. See id. at 258–59.
However, the national government’s response to recent natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina
has received considerable criticism. See, e.g., APPLESEED, A CONTINUING STORM: THE ON-
GOING STRUGGLES OF HURRICANE KATRINA EVACUEES 3 (2006) (noting that local non-profit
and government entities were more flexible and responsive to citizens’ post-Katrina needs and
that some federal entities “did not seem to have the flexibility, training, and resources to meet
demands on the ground”).
165 See, e.g., Whisker, supra note 3, at 959.
166 See Romano, supra note 57, at 237; Whisker, supra note 3, at 959. Although many con-
ceptualize this anti-tyranny role exclusively in terms of militias’ check on federal government
power, see, e.g., Whisker, supra note 3, at 959, the civil-rights era also revealed how militia
members could serve as a check on tyrannical state governments, see MAHON, supra note 4,
at 237–41.
167 See David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying
Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 581 (1991) (noting that militias, “reflecting the sen-
timent of the people, refused to enforce edicts perceived as unjust, or even participated in
popular resistance to them”).
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military leaders, however, were less willing to accept that bargain and consistently
pushed for greater militia control and efficiency at the expense of preserving militias’
check-on-tyranny function.
American militias’ value as a constraint on government power began to crystal-
lize after the French and Indian War. At the conclusion of that conflict, professional
British military forces remained in America to protect the territory they had captured
and to maintain peace between settlers and Native Americans, among other proffered
reasons.168 Given the colonial militias’ success to that point without a strong, central-
ized standing army, the colonists believed the British standing army was unnecessary
for domestic defense, and they were suspicious of the British military’s motives.169
American colonists, who were forced to house the British forces, found them a partic-
ularly “threatening and repressive institution.”170 Britain imposed taxes on the colonies
to pay for its army’s war debts and to maintain its continued presence in the colonies,
which cemented colonists’ perception that the British government was overreaching.171
Colonists were not willing to trade their fiscal and personal freedoms for enhanced mili-
tary performance, particularly when their militias had proved effective without the cost
of diminished liberty. It was militias that ultimately provided colonists the manpower
and military power to resist increasing British government control over the colonies.
After the creation of the Continental Army, revolutionaries recognized that a
strong, unified, professional domestic force presented dangers similar to those pre-
sented by the British military.172 Many colonies, jealous of their sovereignty, reluctantly
allowed their militias to work with the Continental Army, and some militia officers ac-
tively resisted being subordinated to the Continental Army.173 What one citizen might
interpret as a call to patriotic military service, another might interpret as an unconsti-
tutional demand to participate in a war. What one citizen might interpret as an unlaw-
ful insurrection, another might interpret as a legitimate revolution. In a number of
circumstances, militias provided a counterbalance to government action that—to a
considerable portion of the population—had overstepped its authority.174
168 DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 8.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 MAHON, supra note 4, at 42–43; Saul Cornell, Mobs, Militias, and Magistrates:
Popular Constitutionalism and the Whiskey Rebellion, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 883, 903 (2006)
(“It was a civic republican truism that a militia, unlike a standing army, could not be coerced
into fighting for causes inimical to liberty.”). Ultimately, the Second and Third Amendments
implicitly recognized that threat and were designed to protect against government professional
military overreaching. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (guaranteeing citizens the right to keep and
bear arms, ensuring they possess tools to resist tyrannical government empowered by profes-
sional military or police forces); U.S. CONST. amend. III (proclaiming that professional military
forces may not infringe on citizens’ personal privacy rights).
173 MAHON, supra note 4, at 42–43.
174 See Williams, supra note 167, at 581.
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From a domestic-security perspective, consider state militias’ response when
called to quell citizen protests. Shays’ Rebellion is illustrative: depending on one’s
viewpoint, it either revealed the inconsistency and unreliability of state militias as an
insurrection-quelling arm of the national government or emphasized state militias’
check-on-tyranny function.175 In that conflict, some militia members sided with Shays
and his rebels when called to prevent Shays from shutting down certain Massachusetts
courts in a tax-related dispute, believing the government was overreaching; another
militia group later defeated the rebels, captured many of them, and ended the conflict.176
The militia members’ varying responses to the conflict reflected the varying opinions
of the citizenry from which they were drawn. Regardless of the ultimate result, state
militias gave practical voice to the will of the people; they had a significant tool with
which to resist perceived tyranny. However, state militias’ ability to resist national
control is the very reason they could not be relied on as an integral component of
national domestic security.
At the 1787 Constitutional Convention, the Federalists used Shays’ Rebellion
and similar events to justify their position that a stronger standing military force was
required for the new nation in order to guarantee its internal security and the effective
administration of its laws.177 Anti-federalists feared the dangers of unchecked cen-
tralized power, particularly in the form of military force, which strongly resembled the
oppressive British regime the Americans had just rejected and fought to defeat.178
Anti-federalists expected the United States to rely on militias primarily for its domestic-
defense needs and significantly for its domestic-security needs.179 Federalists, focused
on the need for enhanced military effectiveness on a national (and potentially inter-
national) scale, stressed the importance of effective standing military forces.180 Anti-
federalists predicted that states would lose their vitality and become political nonentities
if they did not retain full control over their own militias or if those militias did not play
a primary role in domestic defense.181 Supporters of that position, like Luther Martin
and Samuel Nason, “referred to a standing army as an ‘[e]ngine of arbitrary power,
which has so often and so successfully been used for the subversion of freedom’” and
as “‘the bane of Republic governments,’” respectively.182 Anti-federalists were quite
concerned with a national government’s potential to abuse the power vested in a
175 DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 18; MAHON, supra note 4, at 47.
176 MAHON, supra note 4, at 47.
177 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 17; MAHON, supra note 4, at 47–48; Whisker,
supra note 3, at 958–59.
178 MAHON, supra note 4, at 48; Whisker, supra note 3, at 958–59.
179 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 48; Whisker, supra note 3, at 959 (noting the Anti-federalist
argument that militias could be nationalized to suppress insurrections and repel invasions).
180 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 48; Whisker, supra note 3, at 958–59.
181 MAHON, supra note 4, at 48; Whisker, supra note 3, at 961.
182 MAHON, supra note 4, at 48. Nason observed that, “[b]y [standing armies] have seven-
eighths of the once free nations of the globe been brought into bondage.” Id.
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strong standing national army under its exclusive control.183 They also correctly an-
ticipated that the creation of a substantial regular army ultimately would result in the
neglect of independent state militias, as they no longer would bear important domestic-
defense responsibilities.184
Ultimately, the Militia Clauses of the Constitution and the Militia Act of 1792
fundamentally recalibrated the relationship among state militias, state governments,
and the national government.185 They provided the national government power to call
state militia members for federal service; those militia members no longer owed sole
duty to their states but were potential federal militia members as well.186
As militias embraced their new dual fidelity to state and nation, their effective-
ness as a check on national government tyranny decreased. For example, during the
Whiskey Rebellion of 1794, state militias turned in a more unified performance in
support of the national government than they had during Shays’ Rebellion less than
a decade earlier.187 Some militias opposed the national government in the Whiskey
Rebellion, but an overwhelming number of other militiamen helped the national forces
put down the rebellion.188 State militias still empowered citizens to resist national gov-
ernment overreaching, but the tide had turned—in the event of a conflict between
national and state governments, militias were now more likely to identify with and
support the national forces over their state counterparts. Thirteen thousand militia
members from four states effectively put down the Whiskey Rebellion, overwhelming
a much smaller group of state militia members sympathetic to the protesters, sug-
gesting that state militias as organized under the Constitution and Militia Act of 1792
would prove sufficiently obedient to the will of the national government in the face of
state or citizen opposition.189 A similar inter-militia conflict arose over Fries Rebellion,
in which certain citizens resisted a federal property tax to raise funds for a war with
France, with the same basic result: national forces ultimately triumphed.190 The militias’
overwhelming support for the national interests in those two unsuccessful rebellions
coincided with the beginning of the end of state militias as a meaningful check on
national government tyranny.191
183 See id.
184 Id. In particular, Elbridge Gerry’s words about independent state militias seem prescient:
“If a regular army is admitted will not the militia be neglected and gradually dwindle into
contempt? and where then are we to look for defense of our rights and liberties?” Id.
185 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; U.S. CONST. amend. II; Militia Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33,
1 Stat. 271.
186 See supra notes 56–69 and accompanying text.
187 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 18; Romano, supra note 57, at 241; see also
supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.
188 Cornell, supra note 172, at 898, 901–02.
189 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 18.
190 MAHON, supra note 4, at 54–55.
191 See id. at 54.
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Nevertheless, state militias still retained some capability to resist perceived na-
tional government overreaching. In the domestic-defense context, consider the War of
1812: when the United States declared war on Great Britain, the national government
called almost 100,000 militia members to serve with the standing army.192 Several
governors refused to permit their state militias to be used in the war after concluding
that the basis for the President’s call—to attack the British troops preemptively—was
unconstitutional.193 Because the national government could not force key militia regi-
ments from Massachusetts and Connecticut—some of the best trained and organized
state militias—to participate, several U.S. military operations were meaningfully
hindered, preventing military leaders from accomplishing key strategic objectives.194
And, consistent with their historically defensive focus and geographically limited
service, militia forces from at least two states refused to advance into Canada to attack
British positions.195 In those ways, the states and their citizens provided a check on
potential national government overreaching, but at the cost of overall military effi-
ciency and efficacy.196
An internal uprising in 1877—The Great Railroad Strike—revealed that state
militias had not been rendered wholly impotent as a check on national government
tyranny in the domestic-security context, although they put up significantly less resis-
tance than their pre-constitutional counterparts.197 When striking workers stopped rail
traffic, fifteen states called 45,000 militia members to quell the rebellion.198 Some
192 Id. at 73.
193 DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 20; MAHON, supra note 4, at 67, 73; Whisker,
supra note 3, at 965. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court confirmed that its governor
had the authority to determine whether the enumerated constitutional exigencies existed to
justify calling forth state militias for national service. See A Letter from the Governor of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, with the
Answer of the Justices, 8 Mass. 548, 549 (1812).
194 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 20; MAHON, supra note 4, at 68, 73 (noting
that, as a result, U.S. forces were unable to stop the British from using the St. Lawrence River
to support their military campaign). Connecticut and Massachusetts eventually permitted some
of their militia companies to serve in domestic-security roles, for example, to secure the
borders and to protect against “lawless people.” MAHON, supra note 4, at 67.
195 DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 20; MAHON, supra note 4, at 73–74; Romano,
supra note 57, at 242; Whisker, supra note 3, at 965.
196 However, fifteen years after the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that
a governor had authority to scrutinize the constitutional bases underlying the President’s call
for his state militia to serve nationally, the Supreme Court suggested the President had exclusive
authority to determine whether such bases existed. Whisker, supra note 3, at 965. Compare
A Letter from the Governor of the Commonwealth, 8 Mass. at 549, with Martin v. Mott, 25
U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827).
197 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 42. After the Civil War, most states continued
with volunteer militias, while some embraced compulsory duty. See DOUBLER & LISTMAN,
supra note 2, at 41–42. At least one state, South Carolina, had previously concluded that
militia duty could not be compelled. MAHON, supra note 4, at 74, 111.
198 DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 42.
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militia members sided with the workers, but they were outmanned.199 The militia
members’ mixed performance in responding to the Great Railroad Strike mirrored the
mixed feelings of the broader citizenry from which it was drawn and, for that reason,
should not have been unexpected.
The persistent inability of government to rely on state militias to obey its com-
mands absolutely in the face of citizen protests prompted calls in Congress for addi-
tional militia-reform legislation.200 The national government simply did not want state
militias to exert any resistance to its commands. Early twentieth-century federal legis-
lation (beginning with the First Dick Act) instigated the gradual death of state militias
as a meaningful check on tyranny as the national government expanded its control over
and funding of dual-enlistment state militias;201 by the latter part of that century, state
militias were generally consistently obedient to national government directives.202
D. General Observations
When reviewing the historical rise and ultimate decline of state militias, a few key
observations emerge. State militia duty from its early roots incorporated domestic-
defense, domestic-security, and emergency-response roles and provided citizens a
valuable check on government tyranny. State militia duty initially was mandatory by
necessity, but later militias embraced a voluntary model that proved successful. State
militia duty is exercised by citizens who are organized by the government and those
who are not, by citizens who act independently and citizens who act collectively. The
national government has exerted increasing control over state militias, improving their
broader military usefulness but undermining their other core purposes.
II. ADDRESSING THE INITIAL LEGAL QUESTIONS ABOUT
REINVIGORATED INDEPENDENT STATE MILITIAS: THE COLLECTIVIST
CIVIC-REPUBLICAN CRITIQUE AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
History suggests a role still exists for independent state militias today. What do
legal scholars and relevant law say about the future of independent state militias?
Unfortunately, not much. One group of scholars opposes the reinvigoration of inde-
pendent state militias not because militias were historically unsuccessful but because
those scholars believe militias today could not replicate their historical successes. This
Part first (A) addresses the collectivist civic-republican critique, showing how it is
based on fundamental misunderstandings of historical militia duty (and thus is not a
valid impediment to reinvigoration of independent state militias) but recognizing it
199 See id.
200 Id.
201 See Whisker, supra note 3, at 967.
202 See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller & William G. Merkel, The Second Amendment in Context:
The Case of the Vanishing Predicate, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 403, 536, 543–44 (2000).
2013] THE DORMANT SECOND AMENDMENT 1053
does make a valuable point about the ideal composition of reinvigorated independent
state militias today. This Part then (B) explains how state constitutions strongly support
the conclusion that militia duty is independent, not purely collective, in nature, so re-
invigorated independent state militias should be structured to embrace and encourage
individual and collective exercises of militia duty.
A. The Civic-Republican Critique
The collectivist civic-republican critique, despite acknowledging state militias’
historical successes, argues that reinvigorated independent state militias today would
not be able to serve their historical purposes and effectively perform their core duties.
That critique, essentially unchallenged in relevant part since offered,203 is based on
multiple false premises: (1) that historical militias required universal participation,
(2) that historical militia members were universally virtuous (and much more virtuous
than today’s potential militia members), and (3) that reinvigorated state militia duty
would require governments to arm militia members. Nevertheless, (4) the critique
makes an important point about reinvigorated state militias: to maximize their legiti-
macy as advocates for and defenders of the citizenry at large, those militias should
attempt to maximize citizen participation.
1. Historically, State Militias Have Not Been Universal; Nevertheless, They Have
Provided Broader and More Undivided Representation of Citizen Interests than
Professional Alternatives
A core pillar of the collectivist civic-republican critique is the claim that state mili-
tias historically comprised all citizens204 and, if they did not, they aspired to. History,
however, paints a much different picture; we know that not all citizens of a state were
part of that state’s militia.
Since militias first appeared in the colonies, militia membership has been sub-
stantially restricted on the basis of class, gender, age, race, or some combination of
those characteristics.205 At various times in the states, state militias have been limited
to only landowners, males, whites, and young-to-middle-age adults.206 The federal
203 See MARK V. TUSHNET, OUT OF RANGE 36–37 (2007) (presenting components of
critique).
204 Wendy Brown, Comment, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic
Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson’s The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE
L.J. 661, 663, 665 (1989); Williams, supra note 167, at 553 (claiming that historical state
militias included “all the citizens in a state, in the form of a universal militia, which would
always act in the common good” (emphasis added)).
205 Militia Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (repealed by Act of Feb. 28, 1795, ch. 36,
1 Stat. 424); see DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 5; MAHON, supra note 4, at 14.
206 This makes sense in light of the principles that spawned the first militias—landowners’
militia duty was the counterweight to their freedom. See S.T. Ansell, Legal and Historical
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militia, too, has never been universal but instead starkly exclusive on gender and age
grounds, generally limiting the duty to young males and excluding considerably more
than half of the population.207 Indeed, this author is unaware of any colonial, state, or
federal militia law in the United States, past or present, that has dictated truly universal
militia membership.208 Assuming, as scholars like David Williams and other advo-
cates of the critique believe, that historical state militias “always act[ed] in the com-
mon good”209 (which, like most absolutes, is an overstatement), they did so despite
considerable restrictions on their membership.210 That is, their members successfully
acted with virtue to further their core purposes and civic duty even though militias
did not have universal membership and were not demographically representative of
those for whom they “always act[ed] in the common good.”211 The mythological
militia upon which the collectivist civic-republican critique is based—“composed of
all of the citizens, deriving its legitimacy from them and being virtually synonymous
with them”212—simply did not exist.
Scholars like Williams who press the collectivist civic-republican critique prob-
ably know their universality argument is on shaky ground, which is why they offer a
weaker alternative—that is, that universal membership was “a rhetorical aspiration or
a regulative ideal” even if their claims of universal membership are false.213 But even
the rhetoric they cite does not support that alternative position.
When speaking about historical militias, contemporary statesmen frequently
noted that the aspirational goal of militia membership did not extend to all citizens but
rather was limited to those citizens physically capable of fulfilling domestic-defense,
domestic-security, and emergency-response needs.214 And because the focus often
was on citizens’ fitness to provide military service, this level of ability was generally
Aspects of the Militia, 26 YALE L.J. 471, 472 (1917). Citizens at that time generally believed
that those who did not enjoy the expansive freedom of liberty and landownership recognized
by the colonies, and later the states and the Constitution, did not owe the same duties to their
communities as those who did. See MAHON, supra note 4, at 14 (describing a belief that “a
military obligation rested on every free, white male settler”).
207 See 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2006). Ironically, militias today are more demographically repre-
sentative of the population than at any other time in history. See MAHON, supra note 4, at 252
(noting African Americans are overrepresented in dual-enlistment National Guard); WOMEN
MIL. SERV. FOR AM. MEM’L FOUND., STATISTICS ON WOMEN IN THE MILITARY (2011),
available at http://www.womensmemorial.org/PDFs/StatsonWIM.pdf (noting that, as of
September 30, 2011, women made up 14.6% of the U.S. Armed Forces and 15.5% of
National Guard forces). If anything, the universal-membership argument suggests modern-
day militias are better equipped to serve their civic-republican goals.
208 MAHON, supra note 4, at 14–15.
209 Williams, supra note 167, at 553.
210 Cf. id. (describing the argument of the republican framers of the Second Amendment).
211 Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 554.
214 Williams, supra note 167, at 578.
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referred to as the citizens’ “military capacity.”215 Thus, Williams unwittingly under-
mines his universal-membership claim when he argues that the militia was designed
to include “nothing more or less than the whole people in their military capacity,”
because military capacity was necessarily a narrower universe than the universe of
all citizens.216
Historically, the term military capacity frequently excluded women as a matter
of course;217 indeed, modern U.S. conceptions of women’s military capacity are broader
and more representative of the population now than they ever have been, so a militia
today that aspired to universal membership within its members’ military capacity would
be even more inclusive than its historical counterparts.218 The common exclusion of
women from militia duty is confirmed in the Militia Act of 1792.219 The fact that
women generally were not included in the category of citizens presumed to owe militia
duty precludes any argument for aspirational universal membership by about half.220
Setting aside the gender question, even if militias’ aspiration was to secure universal
membership of members with “military capacity,” in many cases that excluded a sig-
nificant portion of the citizenry based on age.221
Other contemporary commentators described militias in terms that clarify that the
claim of universal membership of members with “military capacity” is untenable. For
example, when Tench Coxe said the militia ensured “the powers of the sword are in
the hands of the yeomanry of America from sixteen to sixty,”222 he noted that militia
duty frequently was limited to landowners, a restriction unrelated to military ability (the
term yeomanry, as used in the United States at the time, typically referred to landown-
ing farmers).223 Militia membership often was limited to landowners, and the militias
215 Id.
216 See id. at 578 (emphasis added).
217 See Militia Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271 (repealed by Act of Feb. 28, 1795,
ch. 36, 1 Stat. 424).
218 See generally Rachel Martin, Women in War: ‘I’ve Lived out There with the Guys’,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 11, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/21/133818218/women-in
-war-I’ve-lived-out-there-with-the-guys (reporting on women’s changing role in the military).
219 1 Stat. at 271.
220 See id. Patrick Henry’s failure to use gender-neutral language in his statement about
aspirational militia membership—“[t]he great object [of the Second Amendment] is, that every
man be armed”—is thus completely understandable and presumptively deliberate, given the
focus on military capacity and those historical perceptions. DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY
THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 386 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Phila.,
J. B. Lippincott Co. 1891) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES]; see also 10 U.S.C. § 311 (2006).
221 For example, citizens aged forty-five and older have been excluded from the definition
of federal Unorganized Militia. See § 311.
222 Tench Coxe, Number III, PA. GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 1788 (emphasis omitted); see also
Williams, supra note 167, at 578.
223 MAHON, supra note 4, at 7. This restriction goes back centuries to the Great Fyrd—a
time in which militia duty was attached to the land because those who owned a piece of the
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at the time were effectively race-limited to the extent they excluded slaves (and others)
who were not free and capable of owning property.224 There is no reasonable basis to
believe that one’s race has anything to do with his military ability. Coxe’s point was
made to contrast the relative breadth of citizens’ militia participation with the exclu-
sive character of militias’ professional counterparts and to show that militias, despite
their limits on membership, nevertheless presented a more citizen-friendly option.225
The only statements even apparently supporting aspirational universal membership
also discuss militia composition in relation to professional alternatives like standing
armies. The context of those statements was the debate between militias and profes-
sional alternatives—that is, which was more accountable to and better represented the
will of the people?226 Those statements are too vague to reference the precise contours
of militia membership but instead are concerned with broader comparisons. Simply
put, no history suggests the colonists or the Framers were concerned with universal—
or even proportionally demographic—representation of the militias, but instead with
whether militia members better reflected the entire population and were more loyal
to citizens’ interests than professional soldiers’ interests.227 The current lack of uni-
versal militia membership would therefore serve as no impediment to the effective
functioning of reinvigorated state militias. The breadth of militia participation—never
actually or aspirationally universal—was sufficient for the Founders and the Framers
and should be sufficient, with appropriate modifications reflecting evolving cultural
norms, today.228
sovereign had a duty to protect its integrity. See MAHON, supra note 4, at 6–7. Ironically, these
self-reliant citizens are the same category of which Williams and his fellow scholars seem so
suspicious. See Williams, supra note 167, at 591 n.223.
224 See Coxe, supra note 222; see also MAHON, supra note 4, at 7, 14.
225 Coxe, supra note 222.
226 Williams therefore sets up a false dichotomy based on an erroneous reading of early
commentators: “To be universal, the militia must comprise all of the citizenry. Republican
writings, of the Anti-Federalist period and before, therefore insisted that the whole people
should be armed, and contrasted this universality with the partiality of a standing army or a
select militia.” Williams, supra note 167, at 578.
227 Richard Henry Lee’s comment that “militia, when properly formed, are in fact the
people themselves” makes perfect sense, given that professional soldiers served the people
as well as their superiors, deferring to the latter when the respective entities’ interests diverged.
RICHARD HENRY LEE, AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER
TO THE REPUBLICAN 169 (Quadrangle Books, 1962) (1788). And when George Mason asked
and answered: “Who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few
public officers,” he obviously knew the militia did not include infants or octogenarian great-
grandmothers but rather phrased his description to contrast a body of citizens with a body
made up exclusively of government employees. See ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 220, at
425; cf. Williams, supra note 167, at 578.
228 Samuel Adams, for example, confirms this reality. He noted that even though the militia
membership was limited to “free Citizens,” there was “no Danger of their making use of their
Power to the destruction of their own Rights, or suffering others to invade them.” Samuel
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In fact, history suggests that embracing a voluntary model—not a mandatory, uni-
versal model—for militia membership is preferable in terms of militia efficiency and
efficacy. Given the enormous size of a mandatory militia force based on current militia
definitions (much less a true universal-participation definition), arming, training, regu-
lating, and managing such a contingent would be impractical, if not impossible. In
addition to the obvious financial and logistical difficulties of attempting to manage
such a gigantic force, the states had little success attempting to compel unwilling par-
ticipants to perform mandatory militia duty—particularly for military needs.229 Indeed,
experts already have considered the impact of the United States’ rapid growth on militia
feasibility and concluded that voluntary militias provide a more manageable, reliable
font of manpower.230
Additionally, voluntary militia systems historically have received more praise
and have performed more consistently well than their mandatory counterparts.231 Even
the National Guard, despite the weaknesses inherent in a dual-enlistment system, em-
braces a purely voluntary militia approach to good effect. The lesson from U.S. history:
voluntary, self-selected militias work well for militia members, the citizenry, the gov-
ernments that need their assistance, and governments’ financial health. Not only is
mandatory militia duty not necessary—much less universal mandatory militia duty—
it most likely is not preferable to a voluntary system.
2. Historical Militias Were Not Universally Virtuous—Some Members Avoided
Their Duty Altogether; Others Performed Poorly
The collectivist civic-republican critique apparently concludes that historical
militias exhibited “virtue” to the extent those militias had success in their core com-
petencies.232 And when scholars like Williams define those successes, they correctly
Adams, Letter to James Warren (Jan 7, 1776), in 3 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 250,
251 (Harry A. Cushing ed., 1907).
229 See, e.g., Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 2–3 (1820).
230 MAHON, supra note 4, at 80–81 (noting nineteenth-century difficulties with a large
potential force). See generally LINDSAY M. HOWDEN & JULIE A. MEYER, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION: 2010, at 4 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov
/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-03.pdf (reporting that according to the 2010 census, roughly 50
million Americans are eligible to be members of the federal unorganized militia). See also
Act of Jan. 21, 1903, ch. 196, 32 Stat. 775.
231 See, e.g., BRUCE L. BENSON, TO SERVE AND PROTECT: PRIVATIZATION AND
COMMUNITY IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1998); LANCE HILL, THE DEACONS FOR DEFENSE: ARMED
RESISTANCE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2004); Douglas Ivor Brandon et al., Self-
Help: Extrajudicial Rights, Privileges and Remedies in Contemporary American Society, 37
VAND. L. REV. 845, 900 (1984) (discussing the value of citizen crime-fighting groups); Tucker
Carlson, Smoking Them Out: How to Close Down a Crack House in Your Neighborhood, 71
POL’Y REV. 56 (1995) (discussing the efforts of community organizations to rid their neighbor-
hoods of crack houses).
232 See Williams, supra note 167, at 554.
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recognize the unique relationship between militia and government—that is, that militia
members have acted virtuously on behalf of the government (for example, by helping
effect its domestic-defense and domestic-security goals) and in limiting government
overreaching and tyranny (for example, militias “offered some advantages for curbing
corruption” by state governments) in the course of their militia duty.233
Assuming those facts are true, is Williams correct in claiming historical militia
members demonstrated such civic virtue universally? Did they always fulfill their mili-
tia duty with the level of personal commitment and success critics suggest? History
says no.
As an initial matter, even those purportedly obligated to militia duty frequently
were not required to fulfill it themselves: states with some form of mandatory duty
had provisions allowing called militia members to pay compensation or find replace-
ments rather than serve.234 Financial substitution for personal performance was per-
fectly acceptable. As a result, militias’ legitimacy and success never depended on
every citizen performing militia duty with virtue but rather on enough willing and able
individuals creating a critical mass of effective manpower.235 Thus, militias were legit-
imate because of their successes in their core competencies—that is, “virtuous” in the
civic-republican critique’s vernacular—and they achieved those successes because a
sufficient number of citizens (not all) possessed civic virtue and performed their mili-
tia duty well.236 Although state militias were not proportionately representative of the
citizens they served, citizens nevertheless trusted their state militias to provide critical
domestic defense, improve domestic security, respond to emergencies, and protect them
against government overreaching.237 This is the nature of pure civic republicanism:
inherent in the term is a notion of representation by civic actors, not universally virtuous
participation (a dynamic evident in the contexts of the right to vote and the responsi-
bility to perform jury duty).238 History reveals no popular opposition either to limited
militia membership—and thus a limited exercise of civic militia duty throughout the
eligible population—or to the general evolution of mandatory state militia duty to vol-
untary state militia duty, which potentially allowed for greater demographic disparities
through self-selection of militia members. Instead, for centuries, citizens have proved
comfortable allowing a subset of the population to exhibit the virtue necessary to per-
form the often dangerous, time-consuming, and financially unfulfilling civic militia
duty on all citizens’ behalf.
Thus, while the overall efforts of the state militias have been virtuous in serving
their fellow citizens, not every actual or putative militia member was universally vir-
tuous. Many proved up to the task of the militia duty, but—particularly in the heat
233 See id.
234 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 18.
235 See id.
236 Id. at 14–15 (examining the development of the militia obligation).
237 See id. at 48–49.
238 TUSHNET, supra note 203, at 35–36.
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of war or in the face of mandatory militia duty—others made quite a poor impression
or inadequately fulfilled their responsibilities to serve.239 Despite less than universal
composition and participation, state militias adequately represented the will of all citi-
zens when they “resist[ed] despotism”240 and were able to “restrain any movement
toward demagogic rebellion,”241 even though they represented only “a partial slice of
society,”242 a portion of which failed to fulfill its militia duty adequately—a far cry from
the ubiquitously virtuous militia described by Williams.243 State militias also success-
fully assisted law enforcement with domestic security and aided first responders with
emergency response despite their demographically underrepresentative composition.244
With history establishing that putative state militia members over the past four cen-
turies have operated with varying levels of commitment and success in their militia
duty, Williams’s wholesale claim that U.S. militia members possessed some height-
ened, universal virtue in centuries past simply is groundless.245
And what of today’s U.S. citizens? Are they really wholly lacking in civic vir-
tue, as civic-republican critics suggest, and thus incapable of fulfilling militia duty
effectively? Statistics suggest today’s citizens are quite virtuous and willing to support
their communities with their money and time—core components of historically effec-
tive militias. More than sixty-four million Americans—about twenty-six percent of
the relevant population—volunteer each year in unpaid roles.246 Given the median
commitment of fifty-one hours for each volunteer, Americans are donating roughly
200–300 million hours or more to public service annually.247 In relevant contexts, the
existence of about 22,000 neighborhood watch groups and numerous other citizen-
directed, citizen-staffed domestic-security organizations; almost 760,000 volunteer
firefighters (about seventy percent of all firefighters nationwide); and thousands of
rescue squad volunteers attest to citizens’ capacity for voluntary civic virtue to achieve
state militias’ traditional purposes.248
239 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 50 (describing one account of the militia’s conduct as
“shameful” and “cowardly”).
240 Williams, supra note 167, at 554.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 18, 41; MAHON, supra note 4, at 85, 149; see
also 10 U.S.C. § 12301(a) (2006).
245 See Brown, supra note 204, at 663, 665; Williams, supra note 167, at 554.
246 Economic News Release: Volunteering in the United States, 2011, BUREAU LAB. STAT.
(Feb. 22, 2012) http://www.bls.gov/news.release/volun.nr0.htm.
247 Id.
248 MICHAEL J. KARTER, JR. & GARY P. STEIN, NAT’L FIRE PROTECTION ASS’N, U.S. FIRE
DEPARTMENT PROFILE THROUGH 2011, at iii (2012), available at http://www.nfpa.org/assets
/files//PDF/OS.FDprofile.pdf. Although the volunteer efforts of domestic-security groups
like neighborhood watch reflect a strong commitment to civic virtue, those efforts often are
ineffective. LAWRENCE SHERMAN ET AL., NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SYS.,
PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T, WHAT’S PROMISING: A REPORT TO
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Perhaps aware that a wholesale attack on modern U.S. citizens’ civic virtue is
untenable, the same critics also argue that those they believe most predisposed to serve
in such militias—current gun owners—are a particularly nefarious lot who not only are
unequipped and unprepared to use those guns for civic duty but also are likely to use
those arms to oppress others.249 There is no way, they argue, that citizens could trust a
militia primarily made up of gun owners, who they claim are not proportionately rep-
resentative of the citizenry as a whole, are sexist and racist, and are untrustworthy.250
All the components of the claim are poorly supported or unsupported and contradict
available historical evidence and contemporary realities.
No statistics show that gun owners who purchased their guns legally are any more
criminal or likely to commit crimes than the general population, and those who support
the civic-republican critique cite none. If anything, recent data suggest that gun owners
are at least as virtuous, if not more so, than their non-gun-owning counterparts.251 Even
if gun owners are more likely to participate in reinvigorated independent state militias,
there is no reason to believe their participation would adversely affect militias’ virtue
or their ability to fulfill their civic duty on behalf of the citizens they represent.
The truth, though, is that citizens neither need to own nor use firearms to par-
ticipate in reinvigorated state militias. Just as military forces, police forces, and first
responders employ those who do not use firearms, reinvigorated state militias could
incorporate many who would have no need or desire to use firearms to fulfill their
civic duty. As advocated in Part III, a broad concept of militia duty would encourage
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS 35–36 (Mar. 17, 2012), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/Digitization/165366NCJRS.pdf.
249 See Brown, supra note 204, at 666; Williams, supra note 167, at 592; cf. TUSHNET,
supra note 203, at 38. Perhaps most shocking, even those responsible for interpreting the Second
Amendment and its relationship to U.S. militias and for establishing the relative authority of
federal and state governments over those militias are not immune to these fallacies. Retired
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens apparently bases his Second Amendment jurispru-
dence on his unsupported and erroneous belief that citizens who keep firearms in their homes
for self-defense purposes cannot adequately protect themselves because they are “not used
to using” those firearms. Joel Gehrke, Justice Stevens: Second Amendment Is ‘No Obstacle’
to Banning Automatic Weapons, WASH. EXAMINER, Oct. 15, 2012, http://washingtonexaminer
.com/justice-stevens-second-amendment-is-no-obstacle-to-banning-automatic-weapons/article
/2510773 (reporting Justice Stevens’ claim that a bedside cell phone with 911 pre-dialed would
provide better protection from in-home danger than a firearm).
250 See Brown, supra note 204, at 665; Williams, supra note 167, at 590–91.
251 For example, one recent study from the Texas Concealed Handgun Association indi-
cated the average citizen was 5.3 times more likely to be arrested for the violent crimes of
murder, rape, robbery, and assault than the average concealed handgun license (CHL) holder
and fourteen times more likely to be arrested for committing a non-violent crime than a CHL
holder. WILLIAM E. STURDEVANT, TEX. CONCEALED HANDGUN ASS’N, AN ANALYSIS OF THE
ARREST RATE OF TEXAS CONCEALED HANDGUN LICENSE HOLDERS AS COMPARED TO THE
ARREST RATE OF THE ENTIRE TEXAS POPULATION (1996–1998), at 24, 27 (2000), available
at http://www.txchia.org/sturdevant.pdf.
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broader citizen participation, including more individuals with no desire to exercise
their Second Amendment rights in connection with their militia duty. Williams’s
vision of a gun-crazy militia is a straw man.
3. Reinvigorated State Militias Can Rely on Citizens To Provide Their Own Arms
The final faulty cog of the civic-republican critique builds on the previous two
fallacies of universal membership and virtue and adds another—the notion that gov-
ernment must arm militia members.252 This component of the argument asserts that
because effective militias must have universal composition, because today’s citizens
lack virtue, and because government must arm all militia members, the mandatory
government arming of unvirtuous, unwilling militia participants will wreak havoc.253
Even if this argument did not fail for lack of historical universal membership or virtue,
which it does, it fails because there is no reason why a government would need to pro-
vide militia members with arms or would need to arm unwilling militia participants.
Having governments arm those who do not want to fulfill militia duty is not only un-
necessary but financially and socially irresponsible. Historical and contemporary real-
ities confirm that reinvigorated state militias could rely on militia members to provide
their own arms where necessary.
State governments need not arm any citizens to have effective militias, nor could
they likely bear that financial burden. For decades (and, in some jurisdictions, even
longer) preparing and arming oneself for militia service was a core component of
the duty.254 History indicates that when governments—particularly the national gov-
ernment—provide the weapons for state militias, those militias begin to look more
like professional, government-controlled entities and less like citizen-driven forces.
Notably, those government-armed militias lose their character as a check on tyranny
because they generate a split fidelity by militia members to fellow citizens on one
hand and to government actors (who provide free resources to the militia members)
on the other. For example, as the national government increased its investments in
dual-enlistment militias in their National Guard form, those units lost their state-
exclusive character and now no longer provide any check on national government
overreaching; they offer no meaningful limit on the expansion of the national gov-
ernment, no doubt in part because the national government pays them and provides
them key resources.255 As a more practical matter, weapons owned by governments
often were poorly managed, cared for, and accounted for by militia members absent
252 Williams, supra note 167, at 592–93.
253 See id. at 593.
254 See, e.g., MAHON, supra note 4, at 16–17; Whisker, supra note 3, at 954–55.
255 Even trade groups like the National Guard Association failed to consider the full gamut
of state militias’ responsibilities (and their citizens’ interests) in the face of increased federal
funding and the prospect of serving a high-profile role in the nation’s military affairs. See
MAHON, supra note 4, at 143.
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the personal accountability inherent in private ownership.256 Finally, arming citizens
is an unnecessary administrative and fiscal burden in a country with around 80 million
gun owners who own an aggregate of 200–400 million firearms.257 The United States
does not need to arm citizens with more guns to have effective state militias.258
Given the historical difficulty of ensuring that state militia members were ade-
quately armed and prepared with the resources to fulfill their duties (particularly
domestic-defense and domestic-security functions), the advantage of modern-day
citizens’ self-preparation is notable.259 States today enjoy the benefit of millions of
self-trained citizens who have purchased and maintain their own arms; states can rely
on their citizens to provide their personal arms and can allow others to participate in
non-firearms-related roles in reinvigorated state militias.
4. The Civic-Republican Critique Correctly Favors Open, Flexible, Inclusive
State Militias, but This Presents No Obstacle to Reinvigorated State Militias
Although the civic-republican critique incorrectly claims historical state militias
had universal membership and that their legitimacy and success derived from that uni-
versality, the implicit foundation of that argument—that state militias should draw
from the broadest spectrum of citizens possible to ensure they best reflect the needs
and will of the citizens they defend and protect260—has value. For example, in discuss-
ing the check-on-tyranny value of historical state militias, Williams accurately notes
256 See id. at 17.
257 According to a 2011 Gallup poll, thirty-four percent of Americans personally own at
least one gun, and forty-seven percent of American households have at least one gun on their
premises. Guns, GALLUP (Mar. 15, 2012), http://gallup.com/poll/1645/Guns.aspx. There were
approximately 117 million households in 2010, and approximately 237 million Americans
eighteen years or older in 2011, according to U.S. census data. Howden & Meyer, supra note
230; DAPHNE LOFQUIST ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2010
(2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf. These data
suggest more than 80 million Americans possess guns and about 55 million households have
guns. A Gallup poll in 2004—when gun ownership was lower—indicated there are approxi-
mately 1.7 guns for every American eighteen years or older, and each gun-owning household
possesses an average of 4.4 firearms. Darren K. Carlson, Americans and Guns: Danger or
Defense?, GALLUP (Jan. 4, 2005) http://gallup.com/poll/14509/americans-guns-danger-defense
.aspx. Those statistics suggest aggregate gun ownership of 200–400 million firearms.
258 Moreover, having the government participate in unnecessary gun transactions, particu-
larly in light of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives’ (ATF’s) Fast and
Furious operation, would be foolish. See, e.g., ATF’s Fast and Furious Scandal, L.A. TIMES,
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/atf-fast-furious-sg,0,3828090.storygallery
(last visited Apr. 16, 2013) (providing links to stories noting that the government used the oper-
ation to allow Mexican drug cartels to obtain U.S. weapons and the ATF lost track of hundreds
of the firearms, some of which were linked to crimes, including the fatal shooting of a border
patrol agent).
259 See supra Part I.A.
260 TUSHNET, supra note 203, at 35–37.
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that “[t]he republican framers of the Second Amendment were painfully aware that
ultimate political power would lie with those who controlled the means of force.”261
And he correctly observes that, “[a]s a result, they sought to arm not a narrow slice of
society that might seize the government for its own end.”262 That militias should be
open and flexible enough to encourage and embrace broad citizen participation is fully
compatible with this author’s vision of reinvigorated state militias. In fact, the develop-
ment of the dual-enlistment National Guard through concerted marketing proves that
demographically diverse and representative militias are realistic,263 and militias’ suc-
cesses when able to specialize reveal the value of capturing the broadest set of relevant
citizens’ skills and experience. As demonstrated in Part III, reinvigorated state militias
should embrace a flexible structure that enables interested citizens to participate in
militia duty locally or remotely, individually or collectively, with or without firearms,
so all interested citizens can contribute in areas where their abilities would best serve
their fellow citizens and their states. Such a structure, in turn, would open militia service
to the broadest group of interested, virtuous individuals. Reinvigorated state militias,
with appropriate marketing and incentives, could successfully attract a diverse, repre-
sentative group across a wide range of substantive aptitudes even in the absence of
universal militia participation.
B. State Constitutions and Militia as an Individual Duty
In District of Columbia v. Heller264 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,265 the
Supreme Court directly rejected the view that the Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms was a purely collective right circumscribed by a collective state militia duty.
Still, the relationship between the individual right protected by the Second Amendment
and the civic militia duty referenced in the Second Amendment is unsettled—courts
have not directly addressed whether the militia duty is individual in nature, as well.266
Two historical considerations as well as the plain language of numerous state con-
stitutions support the conclusion that militia duty is individual in nature—exercised
collectively at times and to different degrees—not purely collective in nature.267
First, militias are created with organized and unorganized components; histori-
cally, their members acted alone or in groups of various sizes, sometimes sua sponte
and sometimes at the explicit direction of government actors.268 State militia structures
historically embraced unstructured, individualized, specialized activity as a component
261 Williams, supra note 167, at 553.
262 Id.
263 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 252–53.
264 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
265 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
266 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 204, at 665; Sanford Levinson, Comment, The Embarrassing
Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 640 (1989); Williams, supra note 167, at 553.
267 Williams, supra note 167, at 577–78.
268 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 19.
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of their successful efforts.269 That is because, unlike government professionals, many
of the state militias’ responsibilities required flexibility, mobility, and the capacity for
individualized, prompt attention to the unique challenges each community faced.270
Second, militias were designed to respect the unique quasi-independence of militia
members—militiamen are not full-time professional employees of the government
but citizens who serve in concert with the government on a part-time basis to protect
citizens’ interests. State militia duty empowered perhaps the most important responsi-
bility for a citizen, a duality: the duty to fight and die for his fellow citizens on behalf
of the government when he believed the government was acting within its constitu-
tional and statutory bounds coupled with the duty to fight and die for his fellow citi-
zens to resist the government when he believed the government was exceeding those
bounds.271 Members could not fulfill militias’ role as a check on government tyranny
if their militia duty were solely collective in nature and thus controlled exclusively
by the state, for they would have neither the authority nor the opportunity to prevent
government overreaching.
Third, state constitutions support the conclusion that militia duty is individual in
nature. Those constitutions have provisions that directly vest citizens with the author-
ity and means to act individually, sua sponte, in defense of themselves, their families,
other fellow citizens, and their property.272 Militia duty is individual in nature, and re-
invigorated state militias should enable and encourage militia service individually or
collectively, sua sponte or in response to government direction. Such militias would be
nimble and flexible, able to fill in states’ emerging domestic-security and emergency-
response gaps.
1. Militias Were Created To Enable Specialization, Flexibility, and Rapid
Response to Community Concerns, Which Goals Cannot Be Accomplished
Through a Pure Collective-Duty Approach
Militia history reveals that militias operated most effectively when they could
tailor their activities to the unique needs of their respective communities and the in-
ternal and external threats they faced. In domestic-defense scenarios, that meant the
state called together a large number of militiamen, trained them for their particular
269 See DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 4–6.
270 See, e.g., id. at 4–10.
271 See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text. A militia member needed to judge
carefully when his obedience to government requests or directives was appropriate and when
willful defiance to resist perceived government tyranny would serve his fellow citizens better;
an ideal militiaman would have the wisdom to know when to obey government requests or
directives, the wisdom to know when to defy them in defense of the citizens, and the courage
to act either way when warranted.
272 See, e.g., ARK CONST. art. II, § 5; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVII; NEB. CONST. art. I,
§ 1; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26.
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military duty, and coordinated their use in a military context. In the domestic-security
context, militias had great success when they were able to specialize and tailor their
activities; one size did not fit all. For example, during the era of continental expansion,
domestic security in a frontier state would require more ad hoc, individualized or small
group action by its militia, while domestic security in a more established coastal state
might benefit from a militia with greater consistency, organization, and structure.273
Specialization of militias’ domestic-security and emergency-response training and
efforts allowed each militia to serve the needs of its citizens best.
In addition, militias have always embraced an unorganized component, which
includes individual, unorganized militia members who may act independently or come
together spontaneously to create an effective force without government intervention,
organization, or direction (as they did, for example, to defend their communities from
the British at Concord or to respond to a natural disaster in San Francisco).274 Through-
out history, state militia duty has been exercised in many different ways: individu-
ally and to form a collective; spontaneously and under direction of the state. It is an
individual duty at its core that manifests itself in those different practical dimensions
depending on community need and circumstances; it is not a purely collective duty
merely because government has had the authority to dictate certain of its characteris-
tics and call members to serve the state.275 This unusual nature of state militia duty—
the expectation of militia members to act both sua sponte and as an organized force
in service of one’s community—renders a collective-duty approach to state militia
duty incomplete.
2. Militia Duty Historically Respected Militia Members’ Authority To Reject
Government Calls for Action When They Believed That Government Action
Exceeded Its Authority, Which Is Inconsistent with a Purely Collective Duty
When one further considers the militias’ role as a check on government tyranny,
a collective-duty theory is wholly inadequate to reflect the comprehensive bundle of
authority and responsibilities state militia duty encompasses.276 Militia members have
proved their willingness not to act on behalf of state and local governments when their
273 See supra Part I.B.2.
274 See MAHON, supra note 4, at 36, 149.
275 See, e.g., Whisker, supra note 3, at 950 (“Most nations, and certainly international law,
recognize the unenrolled militia as the great body of citizens who may rise up to defend their
homes in time of invasion or insurrection.”). Similarly, voting is not a collective civic duty
merely because states may dictate ballot rules and voting times and places.
276 This is demonstrated historically, where we find numerous examples of militia members
not responding to calls deemed overreaching or tyrannical, as they did at the outset of the War
of 1812, in the split loyalties generated by the Great Railroad Strike and the Whiskey Rebellion,
and in the attempted uses of militia to oppose integration. See supra notes 175–76, 187–99
and accompanying text.
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service would support perceived government overreaching.277 Militia members do
not always share the will of their respective state or national governments, and thus a
collective-duty view of militia duty would deprive them of the authority to accomplish
the full scope of militia duty, including their role as a check on government tyranny.278
A collective-duty view is plainly inconsistent with this core militia responsibility,
which has proved historically important, and therefore cannot be correct.
3. State Constitutions Support the Conclusion That Militia Duty Is Individual,
Not Collective
State constitutions (and the courts that interpret them) strongly support the con-
clusion that militia duty is individual in nature and that the full responsibilities of that
duty are enabled by rights to keep and bear arms that specifically authorize citizens
to defend themselves, their families, their fellow citizens, and their property.279 The
Second Amendment notes that a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of
a free state; the right to keep and bear arms provided to the people through that amend-
ment, which is individual in nature, is a key enabler of militia duty.280 Numerous states,
in turn, provide another layer of protection for those militia-enabling arms rights in
their own constitutional Second Amendment equivalents.281 Those states describe the
right in a way that confirms that the concomitant militia duty is not merely collective
277 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2800–01 (2008) (noting that one
of the key reasons why the militia is “necessary to the security of a free state” is because
militia members are “better able to resist tyranny”).
278 To be sure, the measure of state and national government control over state militias does
implicate militia effectiveness in their core functions, as discussed in Part III. For example, the
more nationally funded and nationally controlled state militias have become, the more obedient
they have been to the governments (particularly the purse-holding federal government). This
is reflected in the National Guardsmen’s near-universal obedience to federal (and state, when not
conflicting) calls; their willingness to meet increased training requirements; and their com-
pliance with calls to serve in international military defense capacities—all of which contrast
with the less submissive attitude of pre–Dick Act state militias. To preserve their check-on-
tyranny function, revived independent state militias should be structured to minimize govern-
mental control except where necessary to effect the core purposes of militia legitimately.
279 See Whisker, supra note 3, at 971 (“It is the clear intention of state constitutions generally
to guarantee an individual right to keep and bear arms while simultaneously reaffirming the
right of the state to maintain a militia.”); see also David B. Kopel, What State Constitutions
Teach About the Second Amendment, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 827, 849 (2002) (noting forty-two
states have a provision similar to the Second Amendment and have found that provision
protects a private right). But see Romano, supra note 57, at 235 n.12 (noting recent judicial
criticism of the collective rights model).
280 See U.S. CONST. amend. II.
281 See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, § 5; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XVII; NEB. CONST. art. I,
§ 1; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 26.
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but incorporates critical individual elements—that is, citizens are authorized (if not
expected) to defend the security of the state and of their fellow residents not only when
called in response to explicit state directives and in concert with large groups of other
citizens but also individually in defense of themselves and others in the community.282
For example, at least twenty-five states specifically empower an individual, self-
directed component of traditional militia duty in the domestic-security context, noting
that each citizen has the authority to use arms to guarantee his safety individually and
for the benefit of the state collectively, drawing a textual distinction between the two.283
Even more telling, eleven of those states specifically note that this individual compo-
nent of militia activity extends to protection of persons or property other than the citi-
zen himself—using terms like “family,” “home,” or “others”—even absent explicit
state authorization or direction.284
One might argue semantics—for example, that this legal authority for individual
domestic-defense activities does not speak to militia duty but instead to a separate
individual right to self-defense. That is flatly inconsistent with the language of some
state constitutions and is irrelevant as applied to the others. With respect to a number
of states, the argument fails textually, because their respective amendments extend
beyond the person (simple self-defense) and explicitly reference security of land or
property and safety of family and others.285 Defense of fellow citizens is a core com-
ponent of traditional militia responsibility, as is the security of property within the
state. With respect to the other states, even assuming that the absence of explicit con-
stitutional authority to defend others was intentional, the independent self-defense
authority provided by their constitutions informs militia duty. If the relevant language
protects a separate individual right to self-defense, the broad swath of citizens included
in the state militia must have it. That others not in the militia may also have it is irrele-
vant to the question of whether those in the militia do. Moreover, scholars have ex-
plicitly recognized that this type of unorganized, individual-driven domestic-security
activity—whatever its name—is a component of militia duty.286
282 See, e.g., Kopel, supra note 279, at 829, 832, 836 (analyzing certain state constitutions).
283 Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 TEX. REV. L.
& POL. 191, 205 (2006) (noting that an individual self-defense right is expressly secured, and
keeping and bearing arms for other purposes may also be protected, in Alabama, Arizona,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). An individual right is expressly se-
cured, and court decisions treat the right as aimed at least in part at self-defense, in three other
states: Illinois, Louisiana, and Maine. Id. at 205–07.
284 Those states are Colorado, Delaware, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utah, and West Virginia. Id. at 192–204.
285 See Whisker, supra note 3, at 971.
286 Cf. id. at 950 (noting that the citizen-soldier may be a member of either the unenrolled
or enrolled militia).
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***
There is no legal impediment to reinvigorating independent state militias. The
collectivist civic-republican critique provides no valid basis to oppose such efforts, but
it properly counsels reinvigorated state militias to strive for inclusiveness and to en-
courage broad-based citizen participation to maximize community trust in, and thus
legitimacy of, those militias. To ensure militias may accommodate the widest spec-
trum of capable citizens, reinvigorated state militias should embrace both individual
and collective citizen action—sua sponte and state organized—consistent with his-
torical evidence and state constitutional provisions that indicate militia duty is, in fact,
individual in nature.
III. HOW REINVIGORATED INDEPENDENT STATE MILITIAS COULD HELP
ADDRESS EMERGING DOMESTIC-SECURITY AND EMERGENCY-RESPONSE
NEEDS AND RECALIBRATE FEDERALISM
Given the challenges and constraints facing states and the areas in which state
militias historically have succeeded, the environment for reinvigorating independent
state militias is ripe. This Part will examine how best to structure those militias to ac-
complish the goals of flexibility and inclusiveness while maximizing effectiveness in
their core competencies: (A) State militias should continue to perform their domestic-
defense responsibilities in their National Guard form; (B) New financial realities287
mean citizens no longer can rely on states and their localities to be the exclusive provid-
ers of high-level, comprehensive domestic-security and emergency-response services.
Reinvigorated independent state militias could step in to fill the gaps by providing a
broad-based citizen support network; (C) Federal law should be modified to provide
reinvigorated state militias true independence from federal control, providing a real
check on government tyranny, respecting federalism, and freeing states to attract an
even more diverse, productive set of militia members.
A. The National Guard and Domestic Defense
The National Guard’s tight integration with the national military and its organiza-
tion, structure, and training have made the Guard an effective component of the U.S.
military both domestically and abroad. To the extent the Guard fulfills state militias’
domestic-defense responsibilities, it does so well. The absence of independent state
militias in the domestic-defense context has had no negative impact on military success;
287 See generally CHRISTOPHER W. HOENE & MICHAEL A. PAGANO, NAT’L LEAGUE OF
CITIES, CITY FISCAL CONDITIONS IN 2011 (2011), available at http://www.nlc.org/File
%20Library/Unassigned/city-fiscal-conditions-research-brief-rpt-sep11.pdf; NAT’L GOVERNORS
ASS’N, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES (2011), available at http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites
/NGA/files/pdf/FSS1111.PDF.
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to the contrary, the dual-enlistment National Guard was created specifically to address
state militias’ military weaknesses, and it has served as a more effective, integrated
component of the U.S. military than its immediate state militia predecessors.288 This
is, in large part, because the national government can dictate the size, composition, and
characteristics of each National Guard force; it can control training; and it can con-
trol organizational structure.289 Equally important from the national government’s per-
spective, those Guard forces have provided a critical source of additional manpower for
extended and overseas missions; they no longer are limited by the temporal and geo-
graphic restrictions on traditional state militia service, making them better suited to the
type of global, integrated military strategy employed by modern-day U.S. armed forces.
One would be hard pressed to argue that militias in their National Guard form are not
performing well—perhaps as well as ever—in terms of their defense function, although
at the expense of losing their state character, their pure non-professional status, and
their role as a check on government overreaching.
Because of tightening federal budgets, professional armed forces likely will be
reduced by 100,000 over the next decade, suggesting the National Guard will become
an even more important component of a leaner U.S. military strategy going forward.290
Focusing independent state militias on other militia responsibilities would free the
Guard to focus almost exclusively on its military role, where it likely will be needed
most in the foreseeable future.
B. States’ Emerging Domestic-Security and Emergency-Response Needs
Increasing state and local budgetary constraints are: (1) rendering police increas-
ingly incapable of effectively maintaining the peace; (2) forcing some jurisdictions to
decriminalize violations, forcing some police agencies to stop investigating entire cate-
gories of crimes, and forcing some jurisdictions to stop prosecuting crimes altogether;
and (3) undermining efficient, comprehensive emergency services. Evidence suggests
citizens no longer will be able to rely on state and local governments to serve as exclu-
sive providers of the domestic-security and emergency-response protections to which
they have become accustomed, but reinvigorated independent state militias could help
those governments address those emerging challenges.291
288 See Nathan Zezula, Note, The BRAC Act, the State Militia Charade, and the Disregard
of Original Intent, 27 PACE L. REV. 365, 388 (2007); see also supra Part I. The Army National
Guard is integral to the current defense system; as of 2010 the Army National Guard made up
roughly fifty-four percent of the country’s combat forces. See id.
289 Id. at 367–68.
290 Tom Vanden Brook, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta Defends a Leaner Military, USA
TODAY, Jan. 26, 2012, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-01-26/panetta
-military-defense-cuts/52805056/1 (discussing the Pentagon’s 10-year plan to reduce defense
spending by $487 billion).
291 The emergence and proliferation of private groups like community neighborhood
watches and the Guardian Angels to fill domestic-security gaps attests to the inability of state
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1. Increasingly Nimble and Well-Organized Criminals and Insufficient Police
Staffing Create New Dangers for Citizens, Small Businesses, and Communities
A recent Staten Island incident is illustrative of the new domestic-security chal-
lenges for citizens and the professional police who serve to ensure their security. When
two officers responded to a 911 call reporting a group of teens amassing outside a
house and threatening a teen inside, the officers were unable to maintain order.292 Both
officers were attacked when trying to make an arrest; despite calls for police backup,
the officers were saved and the crowd dispersed only after firefighters on a nearby en-
gine shot a water cannon into the crowd.293 When a large police presence finally arrived,
police were able to arrest only nine of the fifty to sixty instigators.294
Nimble, more coordinated criminal activity like that example is increasing because
of the ease of mass communication via text messaging, Twitter, Facebook, and other
large-scale social and communication networks.295 Increasingly, as in Staten Island,
police across the nation find themselves rapidly outnumbered and incapable of main-
taining peace and arresting criminals in such group settings. In addition to a lack of ade-
quate manpower, police response is reactive and often occurs only after the groups have
reached critical mass.296 Citizens describe these overwhelming scenes with terms like
“human tidal wave[s]” and “a tsunami of kids,” and media often refer to them as “flash
and local governments to maintain their citizens’ security and citizens’ perception that ad-
ditional resources are needed. See generally supra notes 246–48 and accompanying text
(chronicling local volunteer response efforts). The Department of Justice agrees, perceiving a
need for additional citizen involvement in domestic-security activities. See generally ANDREW
MORABITO & SHELDON GREENBERG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,
ENGAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO PROMOTE HOMELAND SECURITY: LAW ENFORCEMENT-
PRIVATE SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS (2005), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja
/210678.pdf. The pro-community, voluntary actions of the citizens who created and populate
private volunteer groups like the Guardian Angels further attest to the font of civic virtue present
in the modern-day United States. See Brandon et al., supra note 231, at 895–901 (discussing
the Guardian Angels); see also supra Parts II.B.1–2.
292 John M. Annese, Mayhem in Mariners Harbor, FDNY Rescues NYPD at Riot, STATEN
ISLAND ADVANCE, Dec. 7, 2011, at A1.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Business leaders and government officials observe that over the past few years criminal
flash mobs have become “an emerging phenomenon” responsible for increasing vandalism,
robberies, and assaults. Liz Parks, Fighting Back: Increased Communication and Tougher
Penalties Are Among Methods to Combat Flash Robs, STORES (Nov. 2012), http://www
.stores.org/STORES%20Magazine%20November%202012/fighting-back.
296 See Erik Ortiz, Chicago Clothing Store Loses $3,000 Worth of Jeans in Flash Robbery,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, July 30, 2012, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2012-07-30/news
/32946321_1_surveillance-video-mob-flash (noting that about twenty young adults robbed
a clothing store of more than $3,000 of merchandise and that police took more than thirty
minutes to respond to the store owner’s 911 call).
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mobs” to describe the sudden and potentially dangerous nature of the gatherings.297
Given individuals’ ability to aggregate en masse with little advance notice via private
or diffuse communication methods that are difficult to track comprehensively, police
often rely on citizens to inform them of impending trouble.298 But when police arrive,
they often find it difficult—if not impossible—to maintain order, and most flash-mob
members can escape without fear of prosecution.
Even when citizens give police advance warning of such flash mobs, police often
do not have the resources necessary to prevent criminal activity proactively. For ex-
ample, in 2011, a neighborhood watch volunteer alerted police to a planned flash mob
in Venice Beach, California, more than six hours before a man was shot by a member
of the mob.299 Despite the warnings, police could do nothing to prevent the shooting
or control the crowd, which rapidly dispersed and hid in nearby shops.300
The lack of adequate police response to spontaneous, coordinated group acts of
criminality seems to have encouraged their proliferation. For example, on Christmas
night, 2011, an estimated 5,000 teenagers descended on a suburban Miami outdoor
mall after being organized on Twitter and Facebook.301 Police needed officers from
nine different agencies to respond to the criminal activity that ensued, but order was
not restored before one officer was punched in the face, at least two employees of the
mall’s movie theater were assaulted, and a sixteen-year-old boy was shot.302 The inci-
dent forced police to declare a countywide state of emergency and impose an 8:00 p.m.
curfew on minors.303
Stories like those, particularly including groups that rob stores en masse (appar-
ently confident that police will be unwilling or unable to prevent the crimes or arrest
the assailants), are increasingly prevalent and threaten serious degradation of security
for individuals in public areas like malls and beaches, for business owners, and even
for individuals in their own homes.304 Police departments are acknowledging the trend
297 Gale Holland, ‘Flash Mob’ on Venice Boardwalk Ends in Shooting, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18,
2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/18/local/la-me-venice-shooting-20110418; Ian
Urbina, Mobs Are Born as Word Grows by Text Message, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010, at A1.
298 See Parks, supra note 295 (noting that police rely on citizen reports and tips provided
through the city’s recently created “iwatchphiladelphia.com” website).
299 Holland, supra note 297.
300 Id.
301 Mall Mob, Shooting Leads to Miami Lakes Teen Curfew, CBS MIAMI (Dec. 30, 2011),
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2011/12/30/mall-mob-shooting-leads-to-miami-lakes-teen-curfew/.
Another large-scale flash mob recently wreaked havoc in and around a Jacksonville, Florida,
Walmart, as 300 young adults robbed and vandalized the store and allegedly discharged
firearms. Liz Parks, Mob Mentality: Multiple-Offender Crimes Are on the Rise, STORES (Oct.
2012), http://www.stores.org/STORES%20Magazine%20October%202012/mob-mentality
?adid=STWeekly.
302 Mall Mob, Shooting Leads to Miami Lakes Teen Curfew, supra note 301.
303 Id.
304 E.g., Kitty Caparella & Stephanie Farr, Another Flash Mob Rocks South Street, PHILA.
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 22, 2010, at 8; Flashmob in Downtown San Jose Starts Pillow Fight, SAN
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and, more important, the fact that their forces are inadequate to manage these mass
events that spawn criminality.305 For example, Detroit police recently warned citizens
to “Enter [Detroit] At Your Own Risk,” noting that, with hundreds fewer officers than
ten years ago, they are unable to protect citizens adequately from “America’s most
violent city” and are “fearful for their [own] lives.”306 Oakland police similarly recog-
nized that a recent crime surge—including a 43% annual increase in burglaries—was
in large part due to the fact that the force had about 200 fewer officers in 2012 than the
800 officers the city employed in 2008.307
In the face of increasing, more opportunistic coordinated criminal activity, concur-
rent reductions in overall police presence are concerning. The number of police officers
per capita in big U.S. cities and states has a strong correlation with crime, and increas-
ing the number of officers in population-dense and high-crime areas has the greatest
crime-reduction impact.308 Thus, the Department of Justice’s October 2011 report in-
dicating police forces were reduced by approximately 10,000 officers and sheriffs’
deputies in the previous year alone suggests even greater threats to domestic security
will follow under the current system.309
Police professionals themselves publicly acknowledge the need for supplemen-
tal assistance with domestic security.310 Some even openly advocate citizens arming
JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Calif.), Feb. 14, 2011, http://www.mercurynews.com/science/ci
_17379761; Troy Graham, 10 Teens Found Guilty of Rioting in Feb. 16 ‘Flash Mob,’ PHILA.
INQUIRER, Mar. 23, 2010, at B1; Richard Khavkine, ‘Flash Mobs’ Burst onto Local Scene:
Throng of Teens in South Orange Part of Growing, Menacing Trend, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Apr. 8, 2010, at 1.
305 See, e.g., Todd South, Chief: More Police Needed, CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS,
Apr. 16, 2010, http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2010/apr/16/chief-more-police-needed
/?mobile.
306 Kathryn Larson, Enter at Your Own Risk: Police Union Says ‘War-Like’ Detroit Is
Unsafe for Visitors, CBS DETROIT (Oct. 6, 2012), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2012/10/06
/enter-at-your-own-risk-police-union-says-war-like-detroit-is-unsafe-for-visitors/.
307 Phil Matier, Oakland Crime Rate Soaring as City Loses Officers, CBS SF BAY AREA
(Nov. 28, 2012), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2012/11/28/phil-matier-oakland-crime-rate
-worries-city-officials/.
308 Steven D. Levitt, The Relationship Between Crime Reporting and Police: Implications
for the Use of Uniform Crime Reports, 14 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 61, 78 (1998)
(suggesting that lack of consideration for reporting bias accounts for previous studies that found
that police force size did not correlate with reduced crime); Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral
Cycles in Police Hiring To Estimate the Effects of Police on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270
(1997); see also SHERMAN ET AL., supra note 248, at 166, 170–71.
309 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., THE IMPACT OF
THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN ON AMERICAN POLICE AGENCIES 13 (2011). Reductions in police
staffing have become so severe that large cities have been forced to cut back or eliminate com-
mon services. For example, Detroit no longer can afford to provide complimentary police es-
corts for funerals. Detroit Ending Free Police Escorts for Funerals, CBS DETROIT (Dec. 6,
2011), http://detroit.cbslocal.com/2011/12/06/detroit-ending-free-police-escorts-for-funerals/.
310 See, e.g., Morabito & Greenberg, supra note 291 (advocating professional-citizen partner-
ships to improve public safety).
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themselves with concealed weapons to fill the security gap.311 And areas with signif-
icant military presence, like Columbus, Georgia, have solicited the help of military
volunteers to serve as “Courtesy Patrol” during high-crime periods to assist overbur-
dened forces.312
Budget cuts also are forcing police agencies to reduce training and delay upgrad-
ing equipment, undermining their effectiveness.313 The lack of adequate resources
seems to be increasing the risks posed to police officers as well, with 2011 produc-
ing one of the highest annual rates of police officer deaths in recent memory.314 The
National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund attributes that problem to increas-
ing “budget cuts to public safety departments.”315
States’ financial challenges are undermining police professionals’ ability to pro-
vide high-quality, comprehensive domestic-security services, but there are a number
of ways reinvigorated independent state militias could fill the gap, including:
Increased uniformed patrols at “hot spots” and “hot times”—that is, high-crime
areas and high-crime periods—produce a strong correlation to reduced crime, even
after those patrols leave the area.316 Moreover, the patrols need not maintain their posi-
tion for extended periods of time to have a persistent effect; uniformed individuals
who stay at hot spots for just fifteen minutes provide a minute-for-minute reduction in
crime after they leave.317 To combat common criminal activity that frequently occurs
at the same time in the same place, one jurisdiction now is using two-person volunteer
patrols in non-police uniforms who are unarmed (they simply alert police to criminal
activity).318 Data and experience confirm that patrol members need to be neither armed
nor members of the police force to be effective, although some type of uniform—and
311 See Sheriff: Time for Citizens to Arm Themselves, WYFF (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www
.wyff4.com/r/29638219/detail.html.
312 Sarah Panko, Military Patrols Start Friday Night in Downtown Columbus, WRBL
NEWS (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.wrbl.com/story/21330594/military-patrols-start-friday-night
-in-downtown-columbus.
313 CHRISTIANA MCFARLAND, NAT’L LEAGUE OF CITIES, STATE OF AMERICA’S CITIES
SURVEY ON JOBS AND THE ECONOMY 2 (2010).
314 Since 2001, more officers died in the line of duty in 2011 than in any year save 2007,
and officer deaths due to firearm fatalities have increased every year since 2008; 2011 totals
are 117% higher than three years earlier. Officer Deaths by Year, NAT’L LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS MEM’L FUND,  http://www.nleomf.org/facts/officer-fatalities-data/year.html (last
visited Apr. 16, 2013).
315 Greg Bluestein, U.S. Police Fatalities Up 13 Percent in 2011 to 173, WASH. TIMES,
Dec. 28, 2011, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/28/us-police-fatalities-13
-percent-2011-173/.
316 See SHERMAN ET AL., supra note 248, at 171 tbl. 8-4; Christopher S. Koper, Just
Enough Police Presence: Reducing Crime and Disorderly Behavior by Optimizing Patrol
Time in Crime Hot Spots, 12 JUST. Q. 649, 657 (1995).
317 SHERMAN ET AL., supra note 248, at 171.
318 Panko, supra note 312.
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its concomitant accountability or authority—seems to be important.319 Therefore,
states could use small or large groups of uniformed militia members on brief patrols,
leveraging whatever time and manpower citizens can offer to generate a meaningful
reduction in crime in high-crime areas while minimizing financial burdens on states.
Some studies suggest that decreased police response times to crime scenes may
help increase successful prosecution of those crimes, but the value derived from more
prompt police response relies on prompt crime reporting by victims or witnesses.320
Studies have shown benefits when reporting times are less than nine minutes, but the
relative scarcity of mobile communications at the time of those studies made such
prompt reporting rare.321 With the proliferation of cell phones, texting, and access to
social networks, prompt reporting of crime—through public or proprietary channels—
is increasingly feasible.322 Such reporting can come from militia patrols in high-crime
areas who witness crime, individuals monitoring social networks who receive reports
of actual or planned crimes, or additional police dispatch support. Those activities may
be too time- and manpower-intensive for police departments to devote additional pro-
fessional resources to, but properly trained militia members could easily provide them
on an individual or group basis.
If citizens simply have an interest in improving domestic security but have no rele-
vant skill set, as militia members they could play potentially valuable roles as indepen-
dent liaisons between public safety professionals and the communities they serve.323
Studies show that citizens’ positive perceptions of police concern for and respon-
siveness to them, as well as citizens’ prior positive interactions with police, have the
potential to reduce crime.324 State militia members drawn from that citizenry, whose
sole purpose is to foster and improve a better relationship with professional public ser-
vants, can help facilitate that goal.325 Particularly in those environments where trust in
the professional police force is at its nadir, state militia members drawn from the com-
munities they serve could prove a valuable bridge between the two groups, helping to
ensure citizens receive the responsive service and professionalism they deserve from
319 See id.; see also MORABITO & GREENBERG, supra note 291, at 16 (noting the value of
citizens’ ability to recognize a private security enterprise).
320 See SHERMAN ET AL., supra note 248, at 169–70.
321 Id.
322 See Holland, supra note 297.
323 For example, when police were unable to prevent a group of about forty young adults
from “taking over” a Detroit gas station, members of a local church went to the station, spoke
to the youths, and advocated on behalf of the owner and law enforcement. Alexis Wiley,
Owner: Loitering Teens Taking Over Detroit Gas Station, Driving Business Away, FOX
DETROIT (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.myfoxdetroit.com/story/19642028/owner-loitering
-teens-taking-over-detroit-gas-station-driving-business-away.
324 SHERMAN ET AL., supra note 248, at 178.
325 See id. at 180 (concluding that focused community policing that improves the relationship
between citizens and police is promising for crime-reduction purposes).
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their public safety professionals and improving those professionals’ understanding
of the needs and challenges facing the communities.
2. Financial Shortfalls Impede and, in Some Instances, Prevent Crime
Investigation and Prosecution for Entire Classes of Crimes
Budgetary constraints are adversely impacting another key component of domestic
security: investigating crimes and prosecuting crimes once suspects have been arrested.
Two recent examples are illustrative.
First, Sheriff Sue Rahr of King County, Washington—a locality with 305,000
residents—recently announced that, due to “draconian” budget cuts, her office no
longer would investigate property crimes as a matter of course: “That means if you are
the victim of a burglary, car prowl, theft, auto theft, fraud, and so on, we will have no
detectives to conduct the follow-up investigation. Our citizens need to know this.”326
Other jurisdictions have similarly found themselves unable to investigate entire cate-
gories of crimes.327
Second, even where police departments can adequately investigate crimes, many
jurisdictions are in such financial straits that they have stopped, or have threatened to
stop, prosecuting certain categories of crimes altogether. For example, the City Council
of Topeka, Kansas, decriminalized domestic violence when it no longer could afford
to prosecute the crimes and provide the required support staff for victims and their
families.328 This shifted the burden to Shawnee County, Kansas, to prosecute the
Topeka crimes in addition to the county’s prosecutorial burden, despite a ten percent
budget cut.329 Shawnee threatened not to continue prosecuting Topeka’s misdemeanors
absent a cash payment of $350,000—equal to the size of the budget cut—and released
thirty domestic violence arrestees before ultimately relenting and agreeing to prosecute
future Topeka crimes, despite being short-staffed.330
Absent a radical financial turnaround, citizens increasingly may face state and
local criminal justice systems unable to enforce their laws, putting people and their
property at greater risk.
State militia members with criminal justice or legal experience and the appropriate
training, where necessary, could assist investigations of lower-priority crimes like the
326 Sue Rahr, Opinion, Sheriff Rahr: The Outcome of Budget Cuts on King County Law
Enforcement, KENT REP. (Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.kentreporter.com/opinion/109072504
.html.
327 See Aimee Green, County Has to Let Lower-Level Crime Slide, OREGONIAN, Oct. 6, 2010.
328 A. G. Sulzberger, Facing Cuts, a City Repeals Its Domestic Violence Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2011, at A11.
329 Id.
330 See Greg Wilson, Cash-Strapped Topeka May Stop Prosecuting Domestic Violence,
NBC CHI. (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/weird/Cash-Strapped-Topeka
-Stops-Prosecuting-Domestic-Violence-131468933.html.
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property crimes King County, Washington, claims it no longer has the resources to
investigate, or they could support prosecutions in jurisdictions like Topeka, which lack
adequate prosecutorial resources.331 State militia members with social work or psy-
chology experience could help provide the pre- and post-trial social services necessary
to support crime victims, their families, and criminals for whom rehabilitative efforts
would prove valuable, on an individual or group basis. And militia members with
mediation or arbitration experience could help resolve disputes without the need for
full-blown litigation,332 just as some historical militias helped resolve land disputes
extrajudicially.333 In those and similar ways, citizens could provide judicial assistance
in a manner similar to the various pro bono efforts of numerous law firms throughout
the nation.
3. Shrinking Budgets Are Forcing Significant Cuts in Emergency Response
Just as financial strains on state and local budgets are negatively impacting police
forces, they are reducing the efficacy and resources of emergency first responders.
For example, faced with a one million dollar shortfall, St. Paul, Minnesota, was forced
to eliminate one of its three rescue squads, which provide critical search-and-rescue
services and address hazardous materials emergencies.334 Similarly, Edison, New
Jersey, attempted to reduce its budget by eliminating its two fire-rescue units and re-
placing them with a single freelance emergency medical technician crew that was qual-
ified neither to fight fires nor perform rescues.335 As a result, citizens frequently were
forced to wait double the recommended time for emergency medical system responses,
and at times the city had no ambulances to respond to citizen emergencies.336 As state
and local budgets have decreased substantially, so have those governments’ abilities
to address citizens’ emergency needs adequately with professional first responders.
331 Rahr, supra note 326; Sulzberger, supra note 328, at A11.
332 In Florida, the Orange County Bar Association provides a good model: it offers free
mediation to resolve family-law issues and citizen disputes involving a number of substantive
legal issues. See Citizen Dispute Settlement/Family Law Mediation, ORANGE COUNTY BAR
ASS’N, http://www.orangecountybar.org/mediation (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
333 DOUBLER & LISTMAN, supra note 2, at 43.
334 Brady Gervais, City May Cut One Rescue Squad—Two Would Still Operate; Union
Offers Its Proposal, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Sept. 15, 2011, at B1.
335 Edison Mayor Jeopardizing Public Safety with Cuts, HOME NEWS TRIB. (Mar. 5, 2011),
http://www.mycentraljersey.com/article/20110305/NJOPINION0201/103050326/.
336 Id. In jurisdictions with adequate financial resources, a dearth of qualified professionals
is creating similar concerns. Philadelphia’s Emergency Medical System, for example, is in crisis
due to insufficient numbers of paramedics. Mike Newell, Butkovitz Finds EMS Responses
Still Badly Inadequate, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 13, 2011, at A1. In 2002, the city had 280
paramedics; seven years later, it had only 210, even though emergency calls increased by about
thirty-five percent. Id. The remaining paramedics are severely overworked, with some crews
taking more than two-and-a-half times the number of recommended calls, often resulting in
unacceptably long wait times for citizens facing medical emergencies. See id.
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Despite being underfunded and generally neglected by their states, SDFs demon-
strate the potential value of independent state militias for emergency response, partic-
ularly in assisting with atypical events that require atypical manpower or events that
are otherwise disproportionately time-intensive. For example, more than 2,200 SDF
members from at least eight states were used to support post–Hurricane Katrina re-
covery efforts.337 New York and New Jersey members assisted in post-9/11 response,
recovery, and infrastructure security.338 And SDFs frequently assist with missing person
searches.339 Independent state militias—particularly if their governments organized,
supported, marketed, and expanded them beyond existing SDFs—could capitalize
on the same volunteer resources on a larger scale to generate greater, more persistent
emergency-response support for states.
A plethora of opportunities exists for states to capture the unique skills of their
citizens—in roles suited for individuals or groups, with or without arms—to improve
emergency response. Reinvigorated independent state militias could provide such ser-
vices to ensure they maximize civic involvement and fill states’ increasing domestic-
security and emergency-response gaps.
C. Federal Law Should Allow for Truly Independent State Militias
State militias provided some restriction on unfettered government power in their
pre–National Guard form. In their current form, however, they no longer serve as
a meaningful check on government tyranny or potential abuse of national military
forces.340 Since the effective federalization of state militias—explicitly through the
National Guard and de facto through 10 U.S.C. § 332, which allows the President to
call and control any state militia341—states have no real power or ability through their
militias to resist tyrannical national government actions.342 States need militias to ensure
their citizens remain “free” from government overreaching, and the individual right to
337 Martin Hershkowitz, Summary of Available State Defense Force After Action Reports
from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Deployments, 2 ST. DEF. FORCE J., 13, 14 (2006), avail-
able at http://www.23bn-vdf.com/s3/AARs%20of%20SDFs%20in%20Katrina.pdf.
338 Arthur N. Tulak, Robert W. Kraft & Don Silbaugh, State Defense Forces and Homeland
Security, 33 PARAMETERS 132, 133 (2003–2004), available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil
/USAWC/Parameters/Articles/03winter/tulak.pdf.
339 For example, a handful of New Mexico members conducted a two-day search for an
eleven-year-old boy missing from his family’s campsite in Robenson Canyon. The volunteers
were able to stay on-site after the first evening and ultimately located the child early the follow-
ing morning. See N.M. State Guard, New Mexico State Guard Search and Rescue Success,
Carlsbad, May 2010 (2011), available at http://data.opi.mt.gov/legbills/2011/Minutes/House
/Exhibits/sth28a01.pdf.
340 See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399–401 (1932) (reviewing a challenge to
a Texas governor’s use of military force to shut down oil wells); Romano, supra note 57, at
241–42; Whisker, supra note 3, at 961.
341 See 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2006).
342 See National Defense Act, ch. 134, §§ 63, 79, 39 Stat. 166, 198, 202–03 (1916);
Whisker, supra note 3, at 961.
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keep and bear arms gives real teeth to state militias’ check-on-tyranny function.343 As
the Founders believed, and as the Supreme Court confirmed in District of Columbia v.
Heller, the check-on-tyranny role that state militias are designed to provide is essential
to healthy citizen-government relations and meaningful federalism.344 But federal law
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries excoriated it, so that protection no longer
exists in any meaningful form after the federalization of state militias. Not surpris-
ingly, absent a meaningful check on government tyranny, political forces from all sides
of the spectrum have joined a crescendo of criticism of federal government actions,
more increasingly accusing the national government of exceeding its bounds and fail-
ing to protect the rights of individuals and of the states.345 Reinvigorated state militias
would help address this concern and recalibrate federalism.
Today, federal law by its terms gives the national government near plenary power
over the state militia members currently enrolled in the National Guard, including the
ability to obviate their state militia status altogether and transform them into a compo-
nent of the regular military forces, with extended tours and the possibility of overseas
deployment346—two characteristics at odds with historical state militia duty. Federal
law also permits the federal government to “use” any other state militia when neces-
sary to further any federal law, among other purposes.347 That ability has a chilling ef-
fect on state militias, because those militia members interested in serving their states
but not the national government—or those who have no interest in engaging in in-
ternational military action—have no productive, safe outlet for their public service.
Similarly, states interested in investing in SDFs or other non–National Guard entities
risk the possibility that the national government will simply take control of them at its
leisure under 10 U.S.C. § 332348 or—as with the National Guard—appropriate them
on a more permanent basis through additional federal legislation.349
To give states the freedom to create, organize, equip, and train militias best
suited to addressing their unique needs, federal law requires revision. The sim-
plest solution is to revise 10 U.S.C. § 311 to limit federal militia to the organized
343 See U.S. CONST. amend II.
344 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2800–01 (2008); Cornell, supra note
172, at 890–91; Whisker, supra note 3, at 961–62.
345 In a 2011 poll, a shocking eighty-nine percent of Americans surveyed said they did not
trust the government to “do the right thing.” Jeff Zeleny & Megan Thee-Brenan, New Poll
Finds a Deep Distrust of Government, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011, at A1. This extreme level
of dissatisfaction with government has spawned Tea Party and Occupy movements over the
past few years, both of which are demanding radical changes in the way government interacts
with its citizens. Id.
346 § 79, 39 Stat. 166, 202–03; 32 U.S.C. §§ 102, 109 (2006).
347 10 U.S.C. §§ 332–333; Perpich v. Dep’t of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 352–53 n.25 (1990)
(noting that non-Guard state militias, including SDFs, may be called by the President for
domestic national service).
348 See 10 U.S.C. § 332 (2006) (providing that the President has authority to call into Federal
service any state’s militia as he sees necessary to enforce laws or suppress rebellion).
349 See Perpich, 496 U.S. at 352 n.25.
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militia—that is, those enrolled in the National Guard and the Naval Militia as
defined by Section 313(b)(1)350—and make clear that the national government can-
not call members of other state militias under 10 U.S.C. § 332 for national service
without a declaration of war. Outside of a legitimate exercise of its war powers, the
national government should limit its control over militias to those who voluntarily
seek to participate in national militia duty—primarily National Guard members who
willingly subject themselves to the possibility of extended, international military duty
in exchange for the benefits Guard membership provides.
Such a limitation on national control over state militias would allow independent
state militias to concentrate their efforts on traditional state responsibilities like domes-
tic security and emergency response, which they have performed well historically,
while providing some check on government tyranny. Respecting citizens’ choice to
participate in a federal or state militia without fear of involuntary appropriation by the
national government would be an important, concrete show of respect for federalism.
Citizens in independent state militias could provide an additional layer of protection
from national government overreach. That check-on-tyranny function, so fundamental
to the federalist structure of our government (as the Constitution recognizes and the
Supreme Court has noted),351 is even more essential in an environment of increasing
national government power.
Based on their historical successes, independent state militias are well suited to fill
states’ emerging domestic-security and emergency-response gaps while reestablishing
a meaningful check on government power.
CONCLUSION
Throughout four centuries of evolution, state militias have played a unique, pro-
ductive, and eclectic role in the bundle of rights and responsibilities citizens possess.
Today state militias are subject to actual or de facto national control, and pure state
militia duty lies dormant. However, simple modifications to federal law could re-
establish independent state militias, providing substantial help in addressing states’
emerging domestic-security and emergency-response needs—areas of traditional state
responsibility in which state militias historically have performed well. Those reinvigo-
rated independent state militias would also provide a meaningful check on national
government overreaching, recalibrating federalism to its intended balance. Moreover,
those militias could be designed by their respective states to capture the maximum
breadth and depth of relevant citizen abilities (consistent with the breadth of the under-
lying civic militia duty), to encourage participation by gun owners and non-gun owners
alike, and to target the militias’ efforts precisely to address their citizens’ greatest
needs. In this way, reinvigorated state militias could serve a critical role in improving
effective state governance while preserving and protecting individual liberty and the
delicate balance of American federalism.
350 32 U.S.C. § 313 (2006).
351 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2800–01 (2008).
